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Statement of Solidarity

The *historiae* editing board and the Students of History at Concordia would like to acknowledge that Concordia University is located on unceded indigenous lands. The Kanien'kehá:ka Nation is recognized as the custodian of the lands and waters which we gather today. Tiohtià:ke/Montreal is historically known as a gathering place for many First Nations. Today, it is home to a diverse population of Indigenous and other peoples. We respect the continued connections with the past, present and future in our ongoing relationships with Indigenous and other peoples within the Montreal community.

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Forward

Welcome to the 21st edition of *historiae*. For twenty-one years, *historiae* has proudly showcased the talents of the vibrant and diverse undergraduate student body at Concordia University. This achievement would not be possible without the continued enthusiasm of the entire History department. The interest of all students, past and present, who continue to submit their work. The faculty's unwavering support and expertise that pushes us all to do our best. The department's enthusiasm and promotion of this journal have been essential to the entire process. I would personally like to thank our faithful editing team for their support, advice, and occasional coffee. This would not have been possible without you.

This year we decided not to approach the submissions with any hard goals in mind regarding the number of submissions published. We wanted to have a nice diverse mix of essay style, length and class level but did not have a required number for each category. Instead, we decided to work with the submissions received and go from there. Fortunately, the submissions were an excellent representative mix of our undergraduate talent. Picking and choosing what got published was not easy. We ended up with the lucky number seven. Initially, these essays were presented chronologically, but it felt a bit odd having some of the longer essays in a row. We decided to mix the order a little bit.

I want to thank all the authors for their submissions. For those who did not have their essays published in this volume, I strongly encourage you to submit your work next year.

Best of luck to volume 22!

Editor-in-Chief

Edwin Henriquez

Editor's Biographies

Amelie Pelletier has a double degree in music and education from McGill University and works as a private teacher! She has returned to university to pursue her true passion for History and academic research. In her spare time, she manages a children's entertainment company and performs as a professional princess! She likes a good book, a good beer, booking plane tickets, and antiques shopping. You can always find her playing Magic the Gathering or Dungeons & Dragons with her friends on the weekend.

Benjamin-Carson Turner -is returning to Concordia to finish my undergraduate degree in history! My main areas of historical interest are trans-Atlantic and North American history though I am also starting to engage more with the practices of public history and oral history. I am trying to learn more about how history intersects with public memory and consciousness, and I hope to continue learning about my own history within Montreal.

Edwin Henriquez Edwin Henriquez is entering the final year of his degree in the History Honours program. He has a strong interest in historiography, transnationalism, and the philosophy of history. He wishes to either pursue a career in academic or find work at a NGO or think tank. He loves all fields of history, but his specific interests lie in the diplomatic and political history of the 20th century or the Cold War. With that said, he will always have time and space in his heart and mind for ancient history. He is an avid fan of the Toronto Blue Jays, David Bowie, and the Legend of Zelda.

Jonnathan I. Koonings- Jonnathan I. Koonings is the current Administrative and Academic Coordinator at SHAC as well as the SHAC-ASFA Councillor. He has a degree from McGill University, is a recovering consultant, and went back to University to pursue a major in History with a minor concentration in Political Science. He served his Congressional District in Washington D.C CA-52, the fighting 52nd, and has worked in Kenya, Japan, and the Middle East. He loves a good herbal tea, a peaty Scotch, a Kentucky Straight Bourbon, leather-bound books, the smell of rich mahogany, nature, and burying his nose in a book or discussing military history. He is always game to watch a great documentary series and just might quote Caesar, something from Gladiator, or John F. Kennedy. His pride and joy is his dog, Jack Franklin Koonings, an Australian shepherd who loves long naps belly-up.

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Autant de façons d'être Québécois:

**An Analysis of the Widening Definition of Quebec Civic Nationalism through Sephardic
Jewish Immigration**

Romy Shoam

Romy Shoam is in her third year at Concordia University, pursuing a major in Community, Public Affairs and Policy Studies and a minor in Women's Studies. She is greatly interested in the social history of Montreal and Quebec, both in academic and public education settings. Romy was a research fellow at the Museum of Jewish Montreal in the summer of 2022, where she led historical walking tours around the Plateau, contributed to the online database through independent research, and executed archival research as part of a commemorative project, to be published this summer. She has also worked as a research assistant on Dr. Anna Sheftel of Concordia University's project "Héritages militants: histoire orale de la grève étudiante de 2012 au Québec, dix ans plus tard." This summer, Romy will assist Dr. Sheftel with research on the Back River cemetery in Ahuntsic.

Ashkenazi Jews are largely featured in the history of Montreal due to their longstanding presence and their contributions to shaping Montreal and its culture. Sephardic Jews, however, are not as prominent in the narrative, considering their later arrival and less significant demographic importance. Nevertheless, the arrival and integration of Sephardic Jewish immigrants in Quebec as of the 1950s, mostly concentrated in Montreal, represent a particular enrichment of Montreal society.

Sephardic Jews are defined as members or descendants of Jewish communities in North Africa and the Middle East. The term *Mizrahi* is sometimes used as a synonym for *Sephardic*. This paper will exclusively use the term *Sephardic* to describe Jews of North African and Middle Eastern origin to stay consistent with the literature on Jews of this origin's migration to Quebec. While this population's ethno-religion as Jews diverged from the pre-Quiet Revolution importance of the Catholic faith as part of the Québécois identity, their arrival from French-speaking North African countries favoured an integration into Quebec society. This paper thus seeks to define Sephardic Jews' place in Quebec's civic nationalist project from their arrival beginning in the 1950s until the referendum of 1995. Through an analysis of the immigration and integration of Sephardic Jewish immigrants from the 1950s to the 1990s, this paper argues that this new Montreal community embodies a new definition of the Québécois nationalist identity. This new civic definition discards an ethnic and religious quality for a linguistic quality and is consistent with the changes during the Quiet Revolution and the discourse surrounding the 1995 referendum. The Sephardic Jews set a precedent for the valuing of French-speaking immigrants in Quebec while exemplifying that there are many ways to be a Quebecer. To illustrate this argument, this paper is divided into three sections.

The first section on immigration describes Sephardic Jews' migratory trends to Quebec. It compares their arrival to other migratory patterns to Quebec and to the earlier arrival of Ashkenazi Jews. This comparison and a description of Québécois politicians' attempts to garner more autonomy in immigrant selection to illustrate the importance of French-speaking immigrants. The second section on integration provides an overview of the Quiet Revolution to explain the motivations behind creating policies for French-speaking and allophone immigrants. It cites policies and newspaper publications to illustrate the increased importance of language as a defining factor of the Québécois identity. The third section analyzes the shift of the nationalist identity to a pluralistic definition as made evident by the campaign and discourse around the 1995 referendum.

Contextualizing Sephardic Jewish Immigration to Quebec

Sephardic Jews began immigrating to Quebec as early as in 1957. This first wave of immigrants, lasting until 1965, arrived from Morocco, following its decolonization. A second wave of Sephardic Jewish immigrants arrived between 1966 and 1975, half of which were Moroccans who arrived in Montreal following attempts to settle in France or Israel.¹ Sephardic Jewish immigration to Montreal counted over 20,000 newcomers “[by] the end of the twentieth century... making up one quarter of the Montreal Jewish population.”² This significant diversification of Jewish demography altered pre-existing truths about the Montreal Jewish population. Unlike Ashkenazi Jews, who had arrived fifty years earlier and significantly diverged from the Québécois identity that was tied to the Catholic Church, Sephardic Jews shared a

¹ Pierre Anctil, “Sephardic Contributions, Hasidic Presence, and New Political Realities, 1960-1995,” in *History of the Jews in Quebec*, trans. Judith Woodsworth (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2021), 290.

² Anctil, “Sephardic Contributions,” 292.

linguistic quality with francophone Quebecers.³ These Sephardic Jewish immigrants also experienced less antisemitism than their Ashkenazi correligionists upon their arrival: they were “spared the virulent anti-Semitic campaigns that appeared in Adrien Arcand’s publications in the 1930s and they were not around to hear the uncharitable anti-Jewish insinuations of certain members of the Catholic clergy.” Furthermore, their arrival was not tinged with the same sense of urgency that characterized Canada’s refusal to admit Holocaust refugees.⁴

New ethnic, linguistic, and economic identities characterized migratory patterns to Quebec from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. These new immigrants arrived from places like Maghreb, the Caribbean, South America, and Southeast Asia.⁵ This period also saw the Quebec government’s attempts and success in gaining more control in the process of selecting immigrants. The government began to recognize the possibility of sustaining the use of the French language in Quebec through calculated immigrant selection. These attempts can be traced back to 1952, when deputy René Chaloult tabled a motion to create a welcome program for French immigrants. This motion, as well as another attempt by the Tremblay commission in 1956 to favour French immigrants, did not pass, “faute de pressions suffisantes exercées sur des responsables politiques plutôt désintéressés.”⁶ Although these motions failed, they served as precursors to the creation of a provincial ministry of immigration in 1968. This gave Quebec more jurisdiction over “an area... which had...been considered a silent threat to the survival of francophone society.” The increasing acceptance of francophone Quebecers that “international immigration” could help “in ensuring the future vitality of the French language” benefitted the

³ Ibid., 293.

⁴ Ibid., 296.

⁵ Martin Pâquet, *Tracer les marges de la Cité: Étranger, Immigrant et État au Québec 1627-1981* (Montréal: Boréal, 2005), 201-02.

⁶ Marcel Martel and Martin Pâquet, *Langue et politique au Canada et au Québec: une synthèse historique* (Montréal: Boréal, 2010), 104.

North African Jewish immigrants entering the province at the time. As will be discussed later on, this acceptance is consistent with the Quiet Revolution's secularizing effects: "[from] the perspective of Quebec nationalism, less important than what the Sephardim were not—Catholic—was what they were—Francophone."⁷ Although the newly-formed immigration ministry did not have direct control in selecting immigrants until 1991, it attempted to exercise this power through other policy proposals. The Gendron commission report of 1972 recommended prioritizing francophone immigrants "si la qualité est 'égale.'" The Lévesque government tried to convince the federal government to grant an increase in points to francophone immigrant applicants.⁸ Only in 1991, following a formal agreement between Quebec and Canada, did the province have control over immigration to prioritize francophone immigrants. It is important to note that this provincial autonomy was "une anomalie à l'échelle canadienne."⁹

These immigration policies are indicative of greater changes taking place in Quebec during the Quiet Revolution. New immigrants, such as Sephardic Jews, benefitted from this attitude towards immigrants as essential in ensuring the French language's survival, as well as an overall greater acceptance of diversity and plurality.

The Quiet Revolution as a Backdrop for Immigrant Integration

The Quiet Revolution refers to the period in the 1960s and 1970s in Quebec history that adopted "secularism and statism" and "rejected traditional Catholic values." The emphasis on the French language as the "centrepiece of nationalism" fostered the development of a Québécois

⁷ Anctil, "Sephardic Contributions," 295.

⁸ Pâquet, *Tracer les marges*, 223-24.

⁹ Pierre Anctil, "Défi et gestion de l'immigration internationale au Québec," *Cités* 23, no. 3 (2005): 43-55, <https://doi.org/10.3917/cite.023.0043>.

identity that did not depend on religion and ethnicity, but rather, language.¹⁰ Quebec's government and general society was concerned with protecting French and promoting Quebec's political influence within Canada. It thus follows that French-speaking Sephardic Jewish immigrants received a "positive welcome."¹¹ The Québécois nationalist identity became "more porous" as it relied on civic rather than religious or ethnic qualities.¹² Sephardic Jews embody this new identity and their integration into Quebec society can be analyzed as a precedent for integration policies.

Sephardic Jews did not fit into the preconceived notions of Jews in Quebec. Although they shared the same values and holidays as Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic culture was much different to the former's culture. The Sephardic Jews, primarily arriving from Morocco, "would soon view themselves as the heirs to the great Sephardic tradition and would gradually abandon their original Moroccan identity." This identity broke down the presumption of Jews as separate from French Canadians, as had previously been true when Ashkenazi Jews were the sole Jewish community in Quebec.¹³

Sephardic Jews created their own community in Montreal which had distinct characteristics from the Ashkenazi community but was not independent of the latter. The seasonal publication *La Voix Sépharade : pulication de la communuauté sépharade du Québec* listed community events, included well wishes celebrating holidays, reports on issues pertaining to Jews in Israel and in the diaspora, profiled community members, and advertised products and

¹⁰ John Dickinson and Brian Young, *A Short History of Quebec*, fourth edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 305.

¹¹ Anctil, "Sephardic Contributions," 293.

¹² *Ibid.*, 294-5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 290-291.

services for the Jewish community.¹⁴ While this was a Sephardic publication, the events listed were often open to both the Sephardic and Ashkenazi community, and it featured articles relating to the Jewish community in general. An aspect in which the Sephardic community clearly diverged from the Ashkenazi community is in accommodation for schools. While the Ashkenazim attended English Protestant schools, an arrangement negotiated in the early 1900s, this English-language education did not suit the French-speaking children of Sephardic immigrants. Thus, after years of buildup, “a group of community activists opened the École Maïmonide in 1969”¹⁵ This school’s founding is considered “an important milestone” since it contributed to “ensuring the survival of the French language within the Montreal Jewish community.”¹⁶ It emphasizes the importance of francophone immigrants in the Quebec nationalist project to preserve the language. It is interesting to note how Sephardic Jewish immigrants took this upon themselves and that future provincial policies require immigrant children to attend French schools.

Sephardic Jewish immigrants’ arrival coincided with the passing of integration policies that prioritized the survival and spread of the French language. As aforementioned, this period prioritized language over culture as part of the Québécois nationalist identity. This secularization, along with a recognition and acceptance of the “communauté culturelle” made up of diverse immigrants allowed immigrants to preserve their identity, particularly their religious values.¹⁷ The Lévesque government’s 1981 multiculturalism policy “*Autant de façons d’être Québécois*” facilitated this preservation while stressing that these *communautés culturelles* would be

¹⁴ *La Voix Sépharade*, September 1987, <https://numerique.banq.qc.ca/patrimoine/details/52327/2688780>.

¹⁵ Anctil, “Sephardic Contributions,” 296.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 303-304.

¹⁷ Anctil, “Défi,” 51-54.

integrated into francophone society.¹⁸ Education plays an important part in this process of integration. Sephardic Jewish immigrants' attendance of French schools "paved the way for new standards of integration, which would be adopted by Muslim immigrants arriving from North African countries." It is even more significant because the Sephardic Jewish immigrants did so "before the language laws passed by the Bourassa and Lévesque governments forced allophone immigrants to send their children to French schools."¹⁹ Bill 22's introduction in 1974 "made French the official language of Quebec" and compelled "[all] non-English children of immigrant parents...to receive their primary and secondary education in French."²⁰ The Sephardim set a precedent for future immigrant practices and integration policies. Their initiative to create and send their children to French schools highlights their embodiment of this new Québécois identity.

Publications in *La Voix Sépharade* provide further evidence for the appreciation of francophone immigrants and promotion of assimilation into francophone society by the Quebec government. In the fall 1987 edition of the publication, several key government representatives submitted holiday wishes. Louise Robic, minister of the "communautés culturelles et de l'immigration" recognized the importance of preserving one's cultural identity that enriches Quebec society. David Crombie, the "secrétaire d'État et ministre responsable du Multiculturalisme" and Lise Bacon, "Vice-Première Ministre" and "Ministre des Affaires Culturelles" also included messages.²¹ These messages are demonstrative of the valuing of

¹⁸ Publication du plan d'action du gouvernement du Québec concernant les communautés culturelles," Université de Sherbrooke, Bilan du siècle, accessed March 25, 2022, <https://bilan.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/pages/evenements/20244.html#:~:text=%C2%ABAutant%20de%20fa%C3%A7on%20d%C3%AAtre,comporte%20la%20vie%20en%20soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9>.

¹⁹ Anctil, "Sephardic Contributions," 305-06.

²⁰ Michael D Behiels, *Quebec and the Question of Immigration: From Ethnocentrism to Ethnic Pluralism* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991), 21.

²¹ *La Voix Sépharade*, September 1987.

immigrants in preserving the French language as well as part of Quebec society, a discourse that was emphasized in the lead up to the 1995 referendum.

The 1995 Referendum: a civic nationalist project

The discourse surrounding the 1995 concretized the civic nationalist project. The “Yes” side used unifying tactics to appeal to the largest number of Quebecers. Nevertheless, loud voices still claimed that a Québécois identity is exclusive. Political commentator Charles Dufour recognized that while every nationalism has “une base ethnique,” nationalism must add “une dimension territoriale” and “une dimension pluraliste” if it wants to stay sustainable in a modern society, like Quebec nationalism had done for the past 30 years.²² Immigration was considered as a method to sustain the French language. Numerous policies, as aforementioned, prioritized francophone immigrants and the assimilation of allophone immigrants. However, the “discours rassembleur” coming from the “Yes” side leader Bouchard emphasized the “‘nous’ de l’ethnie, nous avons souffert, nous avons été trahis, etc.” This emphasis demonizes the ‘others.’²³ Furthermore, premier Parizeau’s faulted “l’argent et les votes ethniques” for the loss of the “Yes” side during his speech following the results.²⁴

These conflicting definitions of the Québécois identity demonstrate the dynamism of the changing definition since the transition of the Quiet Revolution. Despite some exclusionary discourse, civic nationalism as a project to preserve francophone language and culture valued immigrants, namely francophone immigrants like the Sephardic Jewish community. Those who disagreed with this, such as Parizeau, are remembered because their shocking statements made

²² *Referendum - Take Two/Prise Deux*, directed by Stéphane Drolet (National Film Board of Canada, 1996), 13:50. https://www.nfb.ca/film/referendum_take_2_prise_deux/.

²³ *Referendum*, 12:45.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 1:15.

an impact on listeners. In fact, the general Québécois society regards immigrants and “la diversité culturelle” in a positive way, as long as they adopt the French language in public spaces and integrate into “la majorité francophone”²⁵

Conclusion

Sephardic Jewish immigrants’ arrival and integration into francophone Quebec society, mainly concentrated in Montreal, indicates a larger pattern of immigration to Quebec at the time. The mother tongue of these North African Jewish immigrants prompted Quebec society to reimagine its definition of Québécois. An ethnic and religious nationalist identity shifted to a civic nationalist one to accommodate this new pluralistic approach. The widening of this definition was due to an increased panic about sustaining francophone society. This worry changed the conception of immigrants for Quebec society, as made evident through government policies and outreach. The Quiet Revolution secularizing changes facilitated this acceptance, as well as the campaign for the “Yes” side prior to the 1995 referendum that attempted to unify Quebecers and solidify a nationalist identity.

²⁵ Anctil, “Défi,” 50.

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EDWARD THE CONFESSOR CONSTRUCTED

Jonnathan I. Koonings

When reading any account of the Norman Conquest of England, or the political questions that preceded and followed it, it is readily apparent that Julius Caesar’s observation, “[m]en, in general, are quick to believe that which they wish to be true”¹ was timeless. Anyone who sets out to sort fact from fiction between the various contemporaneous accounts will ultimately find that it is an exercise in exploring the limits of human frustration. The Bayeux Tapestry and the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle like many medieval narratives are unreliable sources of truth at best, and evocative pieces of propaganda at worst. It will never be possible to definitively determine what exactly happened during the eleventh-century in England, we can’t even decide what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, but we should not be quick to dismiss the depictions of the events from the *Chronicle* and the *Bayeux Tapestry* as pure myth or legend, a lot of details and claims within them and other contemporaneous accounts at least seem plausible. Some things, of course, are certainly not in dispute at all, everyone can agree that Harold was made king shortly after Edward the Confessor’s death, and no one disputes William the Bastard earning the change in his sobriquet to ‘Conqueror’ after the outcome of the battle of Hastings – those things surely happened. The focus of this paper will not be on the details that both the ‘pro-Norman’ and the ‘pro-Godwinist’ converge on that are likely true. The focus will be on the shared narrative of Edward the Confessor as an unusually good king, a portrayal that this paper will argue may be based more on fiction than on fact. This paper will examine why it was in both sides’ interest to present him in a similar light and elaborate on why those portrayals might be massaged if not mostly manufactured. Tangentially, irrespective of whether the descriptions of Edward the Confessor are purposely constructed or not, the accounts of him still demonstrate, at the very least, the immense importance of portraying an English Monarch as the ‘rightful’ ruler. On the

¹ “Julius Caesar Quotes,” BrainyQuote, accessed April 12, 2023, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/julius_caesar_156555.

Anglo-Saxon side, the clearly biased portrayal of Edward as the personification of religious piety and the bastion of justice resulted from Harold's claim to the throne resting on the shaky foundation of Edward 'giving' him the throne, and later benefitted from Anglo-Saxon nostalgia. The Normans jumped on the Edward-the-Saint bandwagon but accentuated Edward's alleged Normanphilia as they saw the benefit in sanctifying Edward due to it providing cover to the also dubious nature of William's claim to the throne primarily resting on Edward's supposed desire for William to take the throne upon his death. When the figure who is a cornerstone of your claim to legitimacy becomes so beloved by the populace you now oppress and rule, it is in your interest to maintain that affection by any means necessary, making it impossible to offend their legacy even if it was not altogether positive. In other words, the tail wags the dog.

When reading *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, one of the most surprising things is the adulation directed towards Edward the Confessor. He is afforded every compliment a king could wish for from being "righteous" and "pure" to "wise" and "noble."² Moreover, he is absolved of any responsibility for the chaos that took hold of his kingdom upon his death by being declared "blameless."³ When one thinks about the actions and inactions of Edward the Confessor, especially towards the sun setting on his reign, it is hard to believe that he was anything but. To prevent this paper from being classified as a diatribe against Edward, a clarification must be made: the intention is not to argue that there was nothing true contained within Edward's contemporaries' descriptions of him. He restored the House of Wessex to the throne of England without obvious signs of there being questions related to his right to rule or contestation from

² Michael James Swanton, ed., "The Years 1065 and 1066 in the Worcester Manuscript (D) of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle," in *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, trans. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 191-200.

³ *Ibid*, 3.

other claimants.⁴ His reign ushered in a period of stability after seven long years of anxiety and intrigue following the death of Cnut.⁵ By all accounts, his crown bureaucracy was competent, and the judicial and financial systems functioned effectively.⁶ Also, he seemed to preside over a period of relative stability that saw the population increase, cultivation expand,⁷ economic growth, and the people prosper.⁸ Additionally, whether it was a testament to his piety or a symbol of his petty competitiveness, he initiated the most ambitious construction project England had seen since the Age of the Antonines, and in which every English Monarch since William the Bastard has been coronated.⁹ All this notwithstanding, other than Westminster Abbey it is not entirely clear how much of a role he played in these developments, and it could be argued that he simply was in the right place at the right time. For instance, his ascendancy to the throne benefited from the absence of a clear rival, the unexpected disintegration of the Danish dynasty in England,¹⁰ and the early – and decisive - support of the magnates of England, most importantly the Earl Godwine.¹¹ The successes in military and foreign affairs, for example, the defeat of King Gruffydd of Gwynedd, don't seem to be products of his skill and efforts, other than tasking deputies with those portfolios and then not intervening.¹² Simply dispatching a General to fight your wars seems a low bar to clear to get the credit for defending the homeland

⁴ Jessica Nelson, "The Death of Edward the Confessor and the Conflicting Claims to the English Crown - History of Government," January 5, 2016, <https://history.blog.gov.uk/2016/01/05/the-death-of-edward-the-confessor-and-the-conflicting-claims-to-the-english-crown/>.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ John Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions 18 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 66.

⁷ "BBC - History - Edward the Confessor," accessed April 13, 2023, https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/edward_confessor.shtml.

⁸ Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, 68.

⁹ PixelToCode pixeltocode.uk, "A History of Coronations," Westminster Abbey, accessed April 13, 2023, <https://www.westminster-abbey.org/about-the-abbey/history/coronations-at-the-abbey/a-history-of-coronations>.

¹⁰ Frank Barlow, "Edward The Confessor and the Norman Conquest" (The Historical Association, April 1, 1971), The Historical Association; New Impression edition, 11.

¹¹ Nelson, "The Death of Edward the Confessor and the Conflicting Claims to the English Crown - History of Government."

¹² Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, 73.

to the bitter end,¹³ especially at a time when Kings usually led their own armies and fought their own battles.

As a leader and a King, Edward seems to have had an abysmal record. He does not seem to have been able to inspire loyalty to a sufficient degree that his orders were carried out, such as when Godwine refused Edward's orders to sack Dover,¹⁴ making it a wonder as to why *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* claimed men loyally obeyed him.¹⁵ Furthermore, the crisis that ensued after Dover, and that almost turned into a full-blown civil war, seems to have been avoided not because of Edward's interventions or influence, but simply due to the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy's interest in self-preservation.¹⁶ At best, Edward appears to have been myopic and hasty in the way he played the Norman and Anglo-Saxon factions in England against one another; and at worst, he was weak, fickle, and rash. He made and discarded allies quickly and capriciously, as evidenced by the story of how he treated Earl Godwin when the Earl asserted his innocence in the murder of Edward's brother. When the Earl asked Edward for the chance to prove his hands were clean, Edward alleged response was to provocatively suggest that the only way to prove his innocence was to restore his dead brother Alfred and his compatriots to life along with their belongings.¹⁷ While the uncharitable remark likely sprung from the heat of emotion or is an exaggeration, the fact that the story exists points to there being a strong possibility that Edward was a mercurial king who reacted impulsively and severely. Adding even more weight to this possibility is the fact that even *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* describes him as being "blithe of mood,"¹⁸ which can be defined as being indifferent up to the point of being callous, and whatever the author's

¹³ Swanton, "The Years 1065 and 1066 in the Worcester Manuscript (D) of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.", 4.

¹⁴ Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, 72.

¹⁵ Swanton, "The Years 1065 and 1066 in the Worcester Manuscript (D) of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.", 3.

¹⁶ Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, 72.

¹⁷ Barlow, "Edward The Confessor and the Norman Conquest.", 16.

¹⁸ Swanton, "The Years 1065 and 1066 in the Worcester Manuscript (D) of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.", 3.

intended connotation, the choice of that word is at the very least a curious remark. Another potential charge against Edward is that he failed in one of the chief duties of any king, to produce an heir to the throne. While this may not have been his fault, it is an impossible fact to ignore as it precipitated the whole succession crisis. At a time when kings were able to annul marriages so long as they enjoyed decent relations with the Church, it is surprising he did not remarry after Edith's most biologically productive years had come and passed absent a child. Both William and Harold, as well as all the rest of the people to whom Edward possibly promised the throne, would have had legitimate reasons to be frustrated if not outright furious with Edward. Even if one gives Edward the benefit of the doubt and operates under the assumption that he did not make explicit promises to multiple people that they were to be the heir to the throne, it does not seem that he made serious and deliberate attempts to clear up the confusion. If he wanted Harold to be his heir and for the Kingdom to pass to him, he could have issued writs, made public announcements to the Witan, and done more to pave the way for his brother-in-law. Conversely, if he had wanted William to succeed him on the throne, then he could have done more for William, made his wishes known to the Witan, actively sought more support for William from the Anglo-Saxon Earls, invited William to be an associate King, or made public announcements stating, unequivocally, that William was his desired successor. There is no evidence that anything like this happened, probably because Edward never did anything of the kind. Harold would not have had enough time to destroy documentation of William being Edward's heir as his reign was brief and saw him, from the get-go, dealing with crises for its duration, or as the chronicler put it "experience[ing] little quietness... while he ruled the kingdom."¹⁹ William would have sought to preserve anything written by Edward that in any way supported his claim not only to the throne

¹⁹ Ibid, 4.

but that Edward had promised it to him – emphasizing further that documentation of his supposed promise never existed in the first place. It is hard to believe that Edward would have promised the throne of England to a Norman duke and not have documented it.

If Edward had intended for the Aetheling to take the throne, would he have not, at least, tried to have Harold, the most important Earl in England,²⁰ the most appropriate person to act as guarantor to his wishes, and whose support would have been crucial to secure a peaceful transfer of power, swear an oath to the English public to that effect? There is no evidence to suggest that Edward desired this outcome and as Blair, Garnett, and many others would likely agree, there is more evidence to suggest that Edward did not want the Aetheling to become King and that evidence lies in what Edward did not do for him.²¹ All this points to one of two possible explanations, Edward was unable to make serious moves to aid one of the people he supposedly promised the throne to because he was prevented by the Godwinist forces, or he chose not to act simply because he was ambivalent about the situation. It is likely not the former because if Harold and his father had held such sway over the King, then why did neither of them compel Edward to publicly declare Harold as his successor and denounce all the other claimants? Again, the most likely reasons seem to be that Edward the Confessor did not care, just did not prioritize the succession problem and dithered, or at the worst, most cynical and dramatic of scenarios, he desired to precipitate a battle royale for his amusement.

It has been argued that Edward's lack of assistance to any claimant is due to him using the succession question to his advantage, wilily dangling the throne in front of the various

²⁰ Nelson, "The Death of Edward the Confessor and the Conflicting Claims to the English Crown - History of Government."

²¹ Blair, *The Anglo-Saxon Age*, 72., Nelson, "The Death of Edward the Confessor and the Conflicting Claims to the English Crown - History of Government."

claimants to affect certain outcomes or keep various factions in line, this is certainly a possibility. For example, bringing the Aethelings back to England as a tool to keep the Godwinists or the Normans in line would have made sense as a political strategy. The Aethelings merely being pawns in Edward's political scheming would also explain the lack of favours he did Edgar over the many years he was in Edward's court. Although you could also argue that it was in the Godwinists' interest to bring the Aethelings back to England and keep them there because as exiled 'rightful heirs' to the throne of England who had no power base they were ripe for exploitation by an outside force. However, even if you accept Edward's actions and inaction on the succession question as being the result of a deliberate strategy of his, it does not explain why he didn't change tack during the last few years of his life when he and everyone else knew his days were numbered. A competent King who knew he was going to be childless when he died, as the contemporary sources agree he was, would have devoted all his efforts and powers to finding a resolution to that problem, he had at least a few years to find a solution. What's more, the rules and customs governing succession were clearly malleable, especially in the context of the very real, obvious, and widely known succession problem, a problem whose resolution was in every Anglo-Saxon magnate's interest.²² I doubt any of them would have felt the need to stand on ceremony when both the future of Anglo-Saxon rule in England and their well-being were at stake. Regardless of whom Edward wanted or whom he chose, in the last years of his reign, the necessary steps to aid a peaceful transition of power were axiomatic and only a dotard could have overlooked them or their urgency, and all contemporaneous accounts seem to agree he was

²² Garnett, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval England*, 9.

not deserving of that designation.²³ Considering all this makes it hard to believe that he had any strategy at all, at least toward the end of his rule.

The more you think about Edward the Confessor's lack of attention and indecision on the succession problem, the more you realize that it was never going to be peaceful, nor smooth, nor uneventful. What is interesting, however, is that while all who aspired to be king of the English had very good reasons to feel Edward was indecisive, immature, and inadequate to the task of ensuring a peaceful transition of power, publicly declaring him as such might not have gained them much. The reality was quite to the contrary, they had nothing to lose and everything to gain in portraying him as kingly, competent, just, noble, unflappable, pious, calm, and pure - and so they did. The near demigod-like status conferred upon him is evident in both *The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* fawning over him and in his larger-than-life depiction in *The Bayeux Tapestry* where he is taller sitting down than the men standing next to him.²⁴ If Harold or William had portrayed Edward as anything other than a great and wise king, it would have only served to undermine their claims of legitimacy because they both were predicated on Edward, allegedly, promising them the throne, that promise actually meaning something, and Edward designating them as his heir. For Harold, Edward needed to be portrayed as strong and wise to head off potential allegations of him using coercion or otherwise unscrupulous means to extract the designation of him as the Witan and Edward's preferred choice, a prescient move considering that was a charge leveled against him in the *Miracles of St Edmund*.²⁵ For William, who lacked the backing of the Witan and who may have simply been an opportunistic foreign invader who desired England just

²³ Barlow, "Edward The Confessor and the Norman Conquest.", 14.

²⁴ Swanton, "The Years 1065 and 1066 in the Worcester Manuscript (D) of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle.", 3-4., "Explore the Bayeux Tapestry Online," Bayeux Museum, accessed April 13, 2023, <https://www.bayeuxmuseum.com/en/the-bayeux-tapestry/discover-the-bayeux-tapestry/explore-online/>.

²⁵ Garnett, *The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval England*, 68.

to put his hand in more pockets,²⁶ anything that might serve to strengthen an argument in favor of Edward's testamentary capacity or wisdom was advantageous. What better than to have a soon- to-be canonized king promise him the throne and whose plan was to have him succeed? The 'truth' about Edward, thus, became a product, a product whose sole aim was to satisfy the demands of the political reality both the Normans and the Anglo-Saxons found themselves in. Necessity is the mother of all invention and the need to control resulted in the invention of a new reality: convenient details and truths about the Confessor were highlighted, embellished, or simply created; inconvenient ones were glossed over, downplayed, or altogether ignored and forgotten. In many ways, Edward benefitted from his failures, it was his failures that birthed the desperation of both Harold and William to be seen as his rightful successor, and that desperation necessitated the construction of a legend.

²⁶ John Gillingham and Ralph Alan Griffiths, *Medieval Britain: A Very Short Introduction*, Very Short Introductions 19 (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 52.

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Teaching Terror:

Implications of 9/11 Footage as a Pedagogical Tool in U.S. Classrooms

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On September 11, Americans nationwide were shocked by the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. When informed that the World Trade Center had been struck by airplanes, most Americans interrupted work and turned to the nearest television to view live coverage so they could make sense of the event. Together with the media's dramatic narration, footage of the burning towers and their collapse was disturbing. Witnessing these events unfold on television left an indelible emotional imprint on viewers – for many, it was traumatic. This imprint, since it was experienced by a majority of Americans, was a collective *national* trauma. In the aftermath of 9/11, memories of this shared traumatic experience cultivated sentiments of national belonging and fed into a renewal of militaristic patriotism that culminated in popular support for the War on Terror. While the impact of September 11 became woven into American collective memory and national identity, a new generation of Americans has no memory of the attacks. To teach the events of September 11 to the post-9/11 generation, many states have made teaching 9/11 a mandatory part of standard curricula. However, these standards typically do not specify *how* it is to be taught, leaving school boards and teachers to design their own lessons. A national survey of secondary school teachers found that the most popular method of teaching the subject was to show students recordings of television coverage of the attacks – the same footage most Americans watched that day. When interviewed about how they teach 9/11, teachers have expressed that they use this footage in the classroom in order to give students a sense of what it felt like on September 11. This paper examines the potential political implications of this pedagogical method. It begins by establishing the significance of the television footage by demonstrating that viewing the coverage – rather than simply hearing of the attacks – had a significant psychological impact on Americans, generating a strong emotional response among the population. These emotions were channeled into a vindictive form of patriotism that lent

political support for the Bush administration's aggressive response. After illustrating this dynamic, this paper presents examples of teachers who show students television footage of 9/11 with the intention of generating an emotional impact: they want students to learn how 9/11 *feels*. I argue that teaching students to feel the emotions associated with 9/11 – shock, terror, and anger – may intentionally or unintentionally open the door to reproducing political support for the War on Terror.

This research takes place amid a wider conversation among historians, sociologists, and anthropologists studying the practices and significance of traumatic memory transmission. The transgenerational transmission of traumatic collective memory is a common cultural practice that takes a wide variety of forms and functions. Anthropologists Nicolas Argenti and Katharina Schramm note that evocation of the past tends to be a tool of legitimization and affirmation for communities, and that stories about past violence are often taught in a hegemonic narrative that presents groups in simplified roles, either as victims or heroes.¹ In modern states, such narratives are often transmitted as a method to cultivate belonging to a nation among citizens. As nations do not exist naturally, they must be continually constructed through regular discourse, and schools are sites where nationalist discourses are expressed and taught.² Modern nations have long used state-funded classrooms to transmit nationalist narratives about collective trauma to new generations. Benedict Anderson notes how France developed this practice in the nineteenth century, when it deployed a “systematic historiographical campaign” in the school system to teach a national “family history” consisting of a progression of traumatic slaughters featuring

¹ Nicolas Argenti and Katharina Schramm, eds., *Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on Intergenerational Transmission* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009), 18.

² Thea Renda Abu El-Haj, "The Beauty of America': Nationalism, Education, and the War on Terror," *Harvard Educational Review* 80, no. 2 (July 2010): 244.

victims who, according to the narrative, died for the sake of the French nation.³ More recently, Israel has implemented a narrative about the Holocaust into curricula that centers it as the founding event of the Zionist state. The Israeli Holocaust narrative teaches students that the Israeli people rose up from the ashes of the Shoah to claim a morally legitimate right, earned through traumatic suffering, to settle in Palestine.⁴ Scholar Yasmine Lucas critically examines how this narrative is made compelling and usable for nationalist purposes, finding that it has been crafted to create a particular emotional response, that of the traumatic sublime, a complex feeling produced in a subject who attempts to apprehend a terrifying event beyond comprehension.⁵ Lucas notes how experiencing the sublime can generate a sense of being called to a higher purpose, a calling that can be directed toward nationalism. Following Lucas' analysis of Holocaust memory transmission, this paper submits that showing traumatic footage of the terrorist attacks to elicit an emotional response in American students is a practice that can be put toward nationalist purposes.

While the violence of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were experienced directly and most horrifically by those present at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the vast majority of Americans experienced 9/11 as a televised media event. The three major broadcast networks and all the cable news networks dropped their regular programming schedules to cover the attacks live.⁶ For instance, NBC's *Today Show*, a popular news program,

³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Books, 2006), 198, 201.

⁴ Jackie Feldman, "Nationalising Personal Trauma, Personalising National Redemption: Performing Testimony at Auschwitz-Birkenau," in *Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on Intergenerational Transmission*, eds. Nicolas Argenti and Katharina Schramm (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 106-107.

⁵ Yasmine Lucas, "The Transgenerational Sublime," PhD diss., (University of Toronto, forthcoming).

⁶ Brian A. Monahan, *The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11* (New York: NYU Press, 2010), 55.

interrupted its programming to broadcast footage of the World Trade Center soon after the first plane made impact. It continued to cover the event over the course of the day, relaying footage that included the second tower being hit, the collapse of the towers, and the chaos of people running in fear from the ensuing cloud of debris. These climatic moments were repeatedly played, sometimes in slow motion, ensuring that all viewers tuning in would view this shocking and unsettling footage. The coverage also included horrifying eyewitness accounts of what it was like on the ground, from seeing the planes crash into the tower to watching people falling to their deaths.⁷ Brian A. Monahan, in his analysis of how the media portrayed 9/11, finds that television news further added to the drama by speculating on the loss of life and issuing reports concerning the threat of related attacks, such as unaccounted for planes in the air.⁸ Monahan claims that the attacks and their immediate aftermath exposed television audiences to “some of the most harrowing images ever broadcast,” images that, due to their “volume and ferocity,” made a strong emotional impact on viewers.⁹ These viewers made up the vast majority of Americans; one study estimates that about 60% of Americans watched climatic moments of the attacks live, while over 99% watched some television coverage of the attacks during the following week.¹⁰

Television footage of September 11 had a significant psychological impact on viewers. Numerous academic studies by psychologists have demonstrated that after 9/11, symptoms of distress associated with PTSD were more prevalent in those who had greater exposure to

⁷ Monahan, 77.

⁸ Monahan, 81.

⁹ Monahan, 131.

¹⁰ Roxane Cohen Silver et al., “Nationwide Longitudinal Study of Psychological Responses to September 11,” *Journal of the American Medical Association* 288, no. 10 (September 2002): 1239-40.

television footage of the attacks and their aftermath.¹¹ One study concludes that the psychological impact of a “major national trauma” such as September 11 can reach beyond those who are physically present at the site of a tragedy, finding that watching 9/11 unfold live on television may have constituted a form of “direct exposure” to the event.¹² Anecdotal reports support these findings. One resident of Iowa, Janet Freeman, after watching footage of the towers falling was compelled to clean her home as a method of coping with her distress; it was not until late in the afternoon that she realized she was covered in dirt and still wearing her pajamas.¹³ Brian A. Homsangpradit, who was a secondary student at school in Indiana on September 11, 2001, remembers it as “a life changing experience” – after his teacher turned on the television, his classmates were stunned into silence and they “watched in horror” as people trapped in the towers jumped to their deaths.¹⁴ Susan Demerit, who was in her office at the time of the attacks, reported that a crowd gathered around the television to “watch in horror and helplessness. None of us could bear to see what was happening to our country and all the innocent people for more than a few minutes, leaving with inevitable tears of sorrow.”¹⁵

It is worth considering what kind of impact 9/11 may have had on Americans if the footage was not broadcast. Reports from those without access to a television may provide some

¹¹ Ruth E. Propper, Robert Stickgold, Raeann Keeley, and Stephen D Christman, “Is Television Traumatic? Dreams, Stress, and Media Exposure in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001,” *Psychological Science* 18, no. 4 (2007): 334–40.

¹² Silver et al, “Psychological Responses to September 11,” 1239-40.

¹³ John Bodnar, *Divided by Terror: American Patriotism after 9/11* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 21-22.

¹⁴ Brian Homsangpradit, 9/11 Legends, Vigo County, Indiana. Interviews. Indiana State University Folklore Archives, Special Collections, Cunningham Memorial Library, Terre Haute, Indiana 47809, 2009. <https://jstor.org/stable/community.32865646>.

¹⁵ Celeste Michelle Condit, *Angry Public Rhetorics: Global Relations and Emotion in the Wake of 9/11* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 148.

insight. Born to American parents in Montreal, a psychiatrist interviewed by the author about her memory of 9/11 was a thirteen-year-old student in 2001. She reported that her family did not have a television at home, nor did her school show footage of the terrorist attacks.¹⁶

Consequently, she had no exposure to television footage of 9/11, and she did not see any images of the World Trade Center under attack until later in the week. Her mother, who worked at home, also had no exposure to television footage that day. The respondent reported that neither she nor her mother were particularly emotionally impacted by 9/11. Her father, however, had viewed footage of the attacks on a television at work, and he arrived home “very distressed . . . he was shocked and very upset by what happened.”¹⁷

In the wake of the attacks, Americans sought out ways to cope. Because the attacks, via vivid media exposure, had psychologically impacted the nation as a whole, Americans turned to each other for mutual support and comfort; in other words, that day brought the nation together in grief. Expressions of national unity were reported across the United States. For instance, in Knoxville, citizens erected a memorial they called a “Wall of Unity” near a shopping center, intended to create an “environment of unity, healing, and brotherhood.”¹⁸ In schools, students found comfort in national belonging. One student in Indiana reported feeling that he was in a “safe environment” when the Pledge of Allegiance was recited, while a classmate expressed that reciting it made her “happy” because it gave her the sense that “we are one country – together.”¹⁹

¹⁶ Anonymous interviewee, Oral history interview with author, December 5, 2022.

¹⁷ Anonymous interviewee.

¹⁸ Bodnar, *Divided by Terror*, 22.

¹⁹ Bodnar, 27.

While many Americans processed grief with empathy-based collective mourning for the victims, John Bodnar observes that the dominant method of restoring a sense of security expressed itself as “traditional war-based patriotism.”²⁰ Shortly after the attacks, a national survey reported that 85% of respondents supported military intervention in the Middle East, and that many who were previously not supporters of the Bush administration were now willing to lend political support for an attack.²¹ Letters to newspapers demonstrate the vindictive spirit that swept across the United States. One letter to the Indianapolis Star insisted that the terrorists had sown “the seeds of their own destruction,” while another to the same newspaper called for an “all-out war against terrorism. We expect the president to hunt down those responsible. We want them destroyed. This is war and we must protect ourselves.”²²

Scholars have explored how collective group-level emotions, produced by the circulation of shared discourse in response to certain events which trigger particular emotional responses, can be a powerful driver of political action.²³ Nicole Nguyen notes how trauma and emotions, especially fear, constituted an important dimension of the political response to 9/11. President Bush and his speech writers took advantage of collective shock, fear, and anger to deliver persuasive calls for war to the American public.²⁴ Nguyen calls September 11 a “national wound” that Americans sought “political salves” for in the form of war and securitization, which formed a basis for consenting to the War on Terror.²⁵ In post-9/11 America, citizens learned to

²⁰ Bodnar, 18.

²¹ Bodnar, 26.

²² Bodnar, 24.

²³ Condit, *Angry Public Rhetorics*, 64-65.

²⁴ Condit, 141-143.

²⁵ Nicole Nguyen, *A Curriculum of Fear: Homeland Security in U.S. Public Schools* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 198.

fear terrorist attacks, the threat of which were made ever-present by reminders from Homeland Security in the form of terrorism alerts and bulletins. By making its citizens anxious of a terrorist attack, the United States incited – and continues to incite – Americans to consent to Homeland Security measures and to condone state violence against Muslim suspects.²⁶ Emotion-laden traumatic memories of 9/11 serve to perpetuate political support for the War on Terror.

A new generation of Americans, however, is too young to share memories of that day. To young Americans, 9/11 is history, and history must be taught. There is no national standard for teaching 9/11 in American public schools, leaving its inclusion in curricula up to individual states. A 2017 examination of state standards found that 26 states include teaching 9/11 in some manner.²⁷ The prominence of 9/11 in curricula varies considerably between states. For instance, in Texas, high school students are required to explain the significance of 2001 as a turning point in U.S. history, while in California, 9/11 only appears in state standards for a specialized vocational elective pathway focusing on public safety.²⁸ In states where 9/11 does not appear in standards, or has only a marginal role, many teachers nevertheless feel compelled to include September 11 in their curricula. A nationwide survey conducted in 2019 of secondary school teachers teaching subjects relevant to the terrorist attacks, such as U.S. history, found that 9 out of 10 respondents taught the topic to their students.²⁹ The most common method of teaching

²⁶ Nguyen, 185-6.

²⁷ Jeremy Stoddard, D. Hess, and B. Henne, “9/11 and the war on terror in curriculum and states standards documents data set,” (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin – Madison, 2017). <https://minds.wisconsin.edu/handle/1793/79285>.

²⁸ “United States History Studies Since 1877, High School” Texas State Standards, Texas Education Agency, 2018, [https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac\\$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=19&pt=2&ch=113&rl=41](https://texreg.sos.state.tx.us/public/readtac$ext.TacPage?sl=R&app=9&p_dir=&p_rloc=&p_tloc=&p_ploc=&pg=1&p_tac=&ti=19&pt=2&ch=113&rl=41); “Standard CTE.PS.A.8.3,” California State Standards, California Department of Education, <https://www2.cde.ca.gov/cacs/id/web/27716>.

²⁹ Jeremy Stoddard, “Teaching 9/11 and the War on Terror National Survey of Secondary Teachers” (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin – Madison, 2019).

about 9/11 was showing a video in the classroom, typically footage of the attacks and scenes of the aftermath. Recordings of NBC's *Today Show* live coverage of 9/11 was the most popular footage used in class, along with other news broadcasts. When documentaries about 9/11 were shown, the films tended to "emphasize the horrors of the day."³⁰

When interviewed about how they teach 9/11, many teachers express the opinion that showing television news footage of the attacks in class helps students understand what it felt like that day. One high school teacher in Pennsylvania reported that she shows her students the same *Today Show* episode she watched that day so that students can see "how emotional I get."³¹ Feelings are central to this pedagogical approach. An article in *Time* profiling how 9/11 is taught notes that "as difficult as it may be for older Americans to imagine, students may not feel any particular sense of pathos or fascination about the day."³² The sentiment expressed in this popular magazine is that students need to be *taught how to feel* about 9/11, with the implication that there would otherwise be a disconnect between them and Americans who lived through September 11. The urgency of this issue – there have been multiple news reports about how younger Americans have little attachment to 9/11 – suggests that something as significant as national collective identity may be at stake; in the post-9/11 United States, being affected by and remembering 9/11 has become part of being American.³³

<https://minds.wisconsin.edu/bitstream/handle/1793/79305/Teaching911SurveyFinalReport.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>.

³⁰ Stoddard, "Teaching 9/11 Survey," 9.

³¹ Olivia B. Waxman, "9/11 Is History Now. Here's How American Kids Are Learning About It in Class," *Time*, September 10, 2019, <https://time.com/5672103/9-11-history-curriculum/>.

³² Waxman.

³³ Shannon Handy, "20 years later: How is 9/11 taught in schools?," *CBS8*, September 8, 2021, <https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/local/20-years-later-how-911-taught-schools/509-caba5fc6-cef8-488b-983c-d996b85a6736>.

Classroom viewings of 9/11 footage are not limited to high school. In an interview with Stanford News, political science professor Amy Zegart explains the “predicament” she faced by students who look at 9/11 “distantly and dispassionately.”³⁴ She reports that her students now lack a sense of what it was like to live through 9/11, so she has to “insert those feelings back in.” To do so, she shows her class news clips of the most traumatic moments of the attacks to deliberately evoke a “visceral response.” She claims that this pedagogical tool reproduces in her students feelings of “sadness, horror and anguish that defined 9/11.”

Learning about 9/11 through televised footage may be an especially effective method of creating an emotional attachment to the event. Cultural historian Allison Landsberg has studied how films about the past can produce strong emotions in viewers that leave them with deeply felt “prosthetic memories” of the events depicted.³⁵ By this process, film narrations can generate emotional attachments to the past in those who did not live through the events themselves. Such memories, Landsberg claims, have the ability to shape a person’s subjectivity and politics. If 9/11 television footage can be understood as a ‘film about the past,’ what kind of film is it? Beyond the shocking visual content of the footage, scholars have identified a certain narration to the coverage, noting that as soon as the attacks were identified as terrorism, news anchors presented a dominant frame that emphasized American victimization and the urgent need to seek justice militarily.³⁶ When extensive clips of this narrated footage are shown in classrooms, students are not only learning how to feel about the attacks, but they may also be learning a certain

³⁴ Melissa De Witte, “How Stanford scholars are teaching the next generation about 9/11,” *Stanford News*, September 8, 2021, <https://news.stanford.edu/2021/09/08/teaching-sept-11-2001-attacks/>.

³⁵ Allison Landsberg, *Prosthetic Memory: The Transformation of American Remembrance in the Age of Mass Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press), 2004.

³⁶ Monahan, 64.

perspective on what the appropriate response ought to have been, potentially naturalizing the Bush administration's War on Terror. At Stanford, Amy Zegart makes clear that the footage she shows is intended to help her students put into perspective the decisions made by White House policymakers, who had to "decide what to do" following the attacks.³⁷

As previously noted, schools have long been sites where national belonging is constructed through history lessons designed to promote nationalist sentiments in students. Scholars have applied analytical concepts developed by Michel Foucault to study the significance of classrooms as places where the state can exert power over its subjects. Inspired by Foucault, Stephen J. Ball has traced a genealogy of state school policy to demonstrate how, from its nineteenth-century origins onward, states have used public schools to shape populations into becoming more governable.³⁸ From administering standardized tests to doling out punishment to students who misbehave, teachers exert state-sanctioned power over students to discipline them into productive subjects.³⁹ Some states make this function explicit; Michigan's current standard claims that in classrooms a child will learn "how to be a productive member of society."⁴⁰ Regarding September 11, Michigan requires its students to "analyze how the attacks on 9/11 and the response to terrorism have altered American domestic and international policies," but it does not stipulate *how* 9/11 should be taught.⁴¹ When teachers turn to television

³⁷ De Witte, "Stanford scholars."

³⁸ Stephen J. Ball, *Foucault, Power, and Education* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2012), 43.

³⁹ Ball, 107.

⁴⁰ "Michigan K-12 Social Studies Standards," Michigan Department of Education, 5, https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/mde/Academic-Standards/Social_Studies_Standards.pdf?rev=4bab170dd4114e2dbce578723b37ca63.

⁴¹ Michigan Department of Education, 117.

footage of the attacks as a pedagogical tool, they may be generating emotional responses in students that have the potential to shape their politics and subjectivities. Teaching the feelings of 9/11 by showing repetitive clips of the twin towers under attack can be understood as a method of disciplining the body, as the body carries and feels emotions. In the classroom, students are surveilled by teachers for correct behavior, making the act of watching footage a surveilled lesson. It can be assumed that a student who expresses an emotion deemed abnormal, such as joy, when witnessing the towers collapse will be admonished or disciplined in some way. By reproducing in the next generation the normative feelings about 9/11 shared by most Americans, the practice of showing September 11 footage to students works toward the creation of a more uniform subjectivity that serves the state's objective of fostering national cohesion. While the state does not direct teachers to show the footage in class, it apparently does not prohibit this pedagogical practice. Teachers are surveilled by the state to ensure their lessons do not run contrary to the objective of shaping students into desired subjects, and the state's permission implies that these lessons serve that goal.

While this paper proposes possible implications of showing 9/11 footage in class, there are few direct reports as yet on the actual effects of this pedagogical practice on students. Further research should survey or interview students to find out how their politics may have changed in response to these lessons. Examining a more intensive case, Nicole Nyugen made observations in one secondary school offering a program dedicated to preparing students for careers in Homeland Security. Based on her classroom observations, she concluded that the "haunting violence and sorrow" transmitted by graphic lessons about 9/11 made students feel intense fear

and grief, “furnishing an affective (and effective) rallying cry for a war fought in perpetuity.”⁴² To be clear, Nyugen and others do not claim that viewing these recordings today completely reproduces the experience of witnessing the attack live on 9/11, yet they insist that this practice does have a significant emotional impact on students – though surely some students are less affected than others. It may be tempting to generalize from Nyugen’s observations to claim that those who are shown 9/11 footage are transformed into militant supporters of the War on Terror, but it must be noted that neither teachers nor states have absolute power to shape students as they see fit. Students are capable of resisting attempts to shape their subjectivities; they can rebel against the dominant narrative about the War on Terror and question whether the state’s actions in the name of protecting them against terrorism are justified. In addition, the effect of showing 9/11 footage in class can change depending on how teachers frame the lesson. Teachers who show this footage as part of a wider discussion on the historical context of 9/11 and American involvement in the Middle East, combined with an honest accounting of the War on Terror’s consequences, may provide students with the tools needed to critically examine the legitimacy of perpetuating the ‘forever war.’ However, less than half of the secondary school teachers surveyed about teaching September 11 discuss Guantanamo Bay in these lessons, while over a third reported that they do not cover the war in Iraq or the events leading up to the attacks. Instead, lessons on 9/11 are given on the anniversary of the attacks and are apparently intended to commemorate the tragedy of that day, emphasizing the victims and first responders.⁴³

After 9/11, the United States became an imagined community that had together witnessed and felt impacted by the attacks. This shared trauma formed a national subjectivity marked by

⁴² Nyugen, *A Curriculum of Fear*, 195-6.

⁴³ Stoddard, “Teaching 9/11 and the War on Terror National Survey of Secondary School Teachers,” 5-6.

particular emotions – shock, terror, despair, and anger. These emotions were in large part a natural response to the horrifying footage of 9/11, yet they were amplified by how the television media presented and narrated the event. The Bush administration took advantage of these emotions to obtain popular consent for the War on Terror, a set of policy choices which included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, all ostensibly implemented to secure America against terrorist attacks. These policies have had intolerable consequences, including but not limited to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Middle East; the indefinite detention and torture of Muslims with suspected connections to terrorism; restrictions on civil liberties in the United States; and mass surveillance. Despite these disastrous consequences, U.S. counterterrorism remains politically popular; a 2021 national poll found that a majority of respondents believed the War on Terror has been “successful.”⁴⁴ Memory of 9/11 and the intense emotions associated with it perpetuate consent for these policies. Younger generations of Americans, however, lack these emotion-laden memories, which may put the long-term political viability of the War on Terror into question. When teachers show 9/11 footage in class, they are teaching young Americans to feel what it was like on that day, and this lesson could serve to reproduce political support for the War on Terror. Taking Foucault’s lead, Stephen J. Ball writes that “taken-for-granted exercises of power” can be rendered “intolerable” when examined more carefully.⁴⁵ This paper has scrutinized what might appear at first glance to be a benign pedagogical practice that could in fact have grave political implications.

⁴⁴ Jennifer De Pinto, Anthony Salvanto, Fred Backus, and Kabir Khanna. “20 years after 9/11, most see some success in efforts against terrorism, but threats remain,” *CBS News*, September 10, 2021, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/911-success-against-terrorism-threats-remain-opinion-poll/>.

⁴⁵ Ball, *Foucault, Power, and Education*, 38.

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historiae

**Je Me Souviens: Public Memorialization of Marie-Joseph Angélique in The City of
Montreal and Beyond**

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Place Marie-Joseph Angélique is under construction. Or rather, Place des Montréalaises is under construction. The square, interestingly enough, is one that I have been unknowingly commuting by for the past few months on my way to work. The square surrounds the main exit of the Champ-De-Mars metro station in Montreal's old port, and is currently partitioned into a construction site by a fence, one which I regularly have to bypass on my way to serve lattes and pastries to tourists and office workers. There is a regular at my work who comes in in his construction gear from the site to get a large filter coffee with three milks and two sugars. But what exactly is being built?

The Place des Montréalaises will supposedly be a public space offering further green space and a pedestrian corridor at the gateway into Old Montreal. Particularly, it will stand as a monument to the women of Montreal; it will have a monument which on one side contains the names of the fourteen victims of the 1989 École Polytechnique femicide and on the other will contain the names of “seven women pioneers of the metropolis”: Myra Cree, Jessie Maxwell-Smith, Agnès Vautier, Ida Roth Steinberg, Idola Saint-Jean, Harriet Brooks and Jeanne Mance.¹ But before the plans for Place des Montréalaises, the square outside of Champ-De-Mars metro already had a name: Place Marie-Joseph Angélique.

Marie-Joseph Angélique was an enslaved woman born in Portugal and brought to Montreal in 1729. She is most known today for the fire in Old Montreal that she was accused and found guilty of having set, leading to her death by hanging in 1734.² The square was named for her in 2012, in acknowledgement of the fact that the trial that she faced was biased against her

¹ “The Future Places des Montréalaises,” Ville de Montréal, 24 March 2022, <https://montreal.ca/en/articles/future-place-des-montrealaises-19217>.

² “Marie-Josèphe-Angélique,” Mémoires des Montréalais, Centre des mémoires montréalaises, 7 November 2016, <https://ville.montreal.qc.ca/memoiresdesmontrealais/marie-josephe-Ang%C3%A9lique>.

because of her enslaved status, and as part of a larger gesture to acknowledge the existence of slavery in Montreal's history.³ However, the amount of commemoration for Angélique that the square provides today feels minimal, particularly because of the scant indications of its existence. While the amount that public monuments contribute to historical figures being remembered by populations can itself be debated, it seems clear to me that the more information is available about a monument, or a square, in this case, the more it will be able to achieve its purpose of furthering commemoration.

When I first attempted to find information about Place Marie-Joseph Angélique, my internet searches for "Place Marie-Joseph Angélique" yielded only general results about Angélique and none about the square in particular. Eventually, I realized that searching the francophone spelling of her name, "Place Marie-Josèphe-Angélique," yielded the results I was looking for. I had also heard that there was a plaque at the square, but all the information I was able to find about it suggested the contrary. On the announcement posted to the city of Montreal's website on February 20th 2012 announcing the naming of the square, there is no mention of any visual indication or plaque.⁴ Otherwise, the most accessible information about the square online seemed to be its inclusion in black history walking tours of Montreal, particularly one given by Rito Joseph. In an article about Joseph's tours, published by the CBC in 2020, journalist Shari Okeke stated that "few people realize the spot is named Place Marie-Joseph Angélique... There's no signage, no plaque, nothing to indicate the area has a name."⁵ Similarly, in an article published to McGill University's Race + Space blog entitled "The Placing

³ "La Ville de Montréal adopte une résolution visant la désignation de la place Marie-Josèphe-Angélique," Ville de Montréal, 20 February 2012,

https://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=5798,42657625&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&id=18338.

⁴ "La Ville de Montréal adopte une résolution visant la désignation de la place Marie-Josèphe-Angélique."

⁵ Shari Okeke, "This Montrealer leads walking tours to teach others about Black history," CBC, 25 October 2020, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/sharing-montreal-s-black-history-1.5774618>.

of Angélique,” which explores the way that Angélique has been remembered, particularly in Montreal, Cigdem Talu writes that “Today Angélique is a symbol of Black resistance and liberation, but her legacy is quite invisible in Montreal. In a city obsessed with its own history and “heroes,” no plaques or statues commemorate her.”⁶ However, when I did venture away from my typical route to work around to the other side of the Champ-De-Mars metro entrance, I did find a plaque there.



The Plaque at Place Marie-Joseph Angélique (Photo by James Stewart)

The plaque briefly describes Angélique’s life and her trial, which it notes was biased because of her easily exploitable enslaved status. It also shares the general fact that approximately 1500 enslaved people lived in Montreal from the origins of the colony to slavery’s abolition in 1834. The plaque also sits around two meters from a stylistically identical one that describes the intent behind the Place des Montréalaises. It is hard to know when exactly the

⁶ Cigdem Talu, “The Placing of Angélique,” *Race + Space*, McGill, 16 April 2021, <https://www.mcgill.ca/race-space/article/reading-group-contributions/placing-angelique>.

plaque was put up, but it seems to me that it may have been at the same time as the one for the Place des Montréalaises, perhaps sometime near the beginning of construction.

What, then, will be the future of Place Marie-Joseph Angélique? Will it share the space with Place des Montréalaises? The city's public plans for Place des Montréalaises simply mention that it will enhance the Champ-de-Mars area alongside other projects including the "preservation" of Place Marie-Joseph Angélique.⁷ It is unclear whether the square is to have two names, or whether the space will be divided into separate sections. While some might argue that the memorialization of Angélique fits within the larger goal of Place des Montréalaises to memorialize women that have shaped the city, the city administration seems to have fixed these as two separate projects. Additionally, I wonder if it would honour Angélique to frame her as having shaped the city that she might have tried to burn.

"Might" is the key word in that sentence. It is widely recognized that Angélique did not receive a balanced trial; her status as enslaved person made her easy victim and torture was used to obtain her confession. Therefore, much of the public memorialization surrounding Angélique is focused on debating the question of her innocence. In 2006, the Centre d'histoire de Montréal (today the Centre des mémoires montréalaises) held an exhibition in which visitors acted as the judge in Angélique's trial, deciding whether she was innocent or guilty. A representative of the centre is quoting as having said "Some view her as a hero, and others as a poor black slave who was in the wrong spot at the wrong time. We think that the visitors are intelligent and want them to make up their own minds about who was guilty of this crime."⁸ Similarly, from 2013 to 2014, Château Ramezay, a historical building which now functions as a museum, held an

⁷ "The Future Places des Montréalaises."

⁸ Lise-Marie Gervais, "Pleins feux sur la Nouvelle-France," *Le Devoir*, 27 October 2006, <https://www.ledevoir.com/societe/121359/pleins-feux-sur-la-nouvelle-france>. (My translation)

exhibition entitled “Crime and Punishment– Justice in New France” in which visitors would hear details of criminal cases, including Angélique’s, weigh in on whether the punishments fit the crimes, and compare them to sentences under the modern Canadian Criminal Code.⁹

Beyond museum exhibits, Angélique’s guilt or innocence has been a subtle but present part of how the city of Montreal has chosen to memorialize her in terms of the square and the plaque. The aforementioned report of the naming of Place Marie-Joseph Angélique, posted to the city’s website in 2012, states that her innocence was “plus que probable,” more than probable.¹⁰ Acknowledging the highly biased nature of Angélique’s trial is certainly necessary in order to memorialize her, especially on the part of a municipal institution tied to the one whose legislation enabled Angélique’s enslavement and execution. However, going the step further to assert that she was innocent is not. Presuming Angélique’s innocence moves beyond acknowledging the injustice of the trial she faced into an interweaving of her innocence with her memorialization. I wonder if the city would feel comfortable presuming that she could have been guilty of setting the fire and still honouring her in the same way.

Believing that Angélique set the fire evidently does not have to mean denouncing her actions or believing that the execution she faced was just. In *The Hanging of Angélique*, a book that delves into what we can know about Angélique’s life and trial from the court records and the historical circumstances that she lived in, Afua Cooper asserts that she believes Angélique did set the fire, reminding readers of the quite substantial motives that Angélique had and the way that arson was a common tool used by Afro-descendant slaves throughout the Americas.¹¹ Even with

⁹ “Previous Exhibitions,” Château Ramezay, <https://www.chateauramezay.qc.ca/en/exhibitions/previous-exhibitions/#2014>.

¹⁰ “La Ville de Montréal adopte une résolution visant la désignation de la place Marie-Josèphe-Angélique.”

¹¹ Afua Cooper, *The Hanging of Angélique* (Toronto: HarperCollins, 2006), 9.

very little knowledge of Angélique's situation and trial, members of the public can surely ascertain that an act of resistance such as this fire would be a logical and righteous response to the terrors of enslavement.

Ultimately though, I wonder if focusing our public memorialization of Angélique onto the question of her guilt or innocence truly honours her. The reason that we have the knowledge of Angélique and her life that we do today is because of her trial, but I hold issue with focusing entirely on this element of her life over what we can learn about her experience as a slave and the historical moment she lived in through it. Cooper's *The Hanging of Angélique*, while somewhat centered around this question of guilt or innocence, does engage with Angélique's story in this way, branching into what we can know about the experiences of enslaved people in New France in the 18th century by way of Angélique's trial. Yet Cooper also stresses the importance of viewing the court proceedings of Angélique themselves as a slave narrative. She cites George Elliot Clarke in describing how previously only narratives that were authored by slaves themselves were considered slave narratives. Therefore, it is revolutionary to not only have these incredibly detailed court proceedings which offer us extraordinary insight into Angélique's life, but to consider them a slave narrative.¹² Additionally, in her piece on Angélique's legacy in 20th century Black-Canadian drama, Pilar Cuder-Dominguez stresses the significance of Angélique's narrative as being centered around justice rather than the predominant slave narrative of the journey towards freedom. According to Cuder-Dominguez, Angélique's trial, public torture, and execution stand as evidence to "the lengths to which local communities will go to secure racial,

¹² Cooper, 305.

economic, and gender hierarchies” and insight into the female slave’s experience beyond “the popular imagination [...] of a semi-naked, nameless body at the auction block.”¹³

Nonetheless, I believe that we can harness Angélique’s trial as her narrative without giving all the power or focus within that narrative towards the question of her guilt or innocence. Marie-Joseph Angélique’s life was continuously shaped by forces outside of her control due to her enslavement, and although her potential lighting of the fire in 1734 may have been an act of agency, the way that her life ended and has been remembered was not in her control, and therefore marks a continuation of the violence and lack of agency that she experienced during her lifetime. In “Venus in Two Acts,” Saidiya Hartman proposes that there is a continuation of violence involved in seeking that people whose lives, bodies, and agencies were stolen from them continue to provide for our historical purposes today.¹⁴ Equally though, Hartman quotes Foucault in describing the impossibility of trying to understand who slaves were “as they might have been in a free state.”¹⁵ We cannot change the fact that our understanding of Angélique’s life is shaped by the trial and the system she was subjected to. We can, however, choose to engage with her story and trial in a myriad of ways that do not solely focus on her guilt or innocence.

One of the places that I found Angélique’s story recounted with surprising insight was in a book of ghost stories, *Macabre Montreal*. The book shares a variety of stories that mostly have to do with people’s sightings and experiences with the supernatural, and I was therefore interested in the rather out of place inclusion of Angélique’s trial. In the book’s conclusion, co-author Mark Leslie explains that “This book doesn’t just talk about ghosts, but also the ghostly

¹³ Pilar Cuder-Dominguez quoting Katherine McKittrick, “The legacy of Angélique in late 20th-century Black Canadian drama,” *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 58, no. 3 (2021): 324; Cuder-Dominguez, 324.

¹⁴ Saidiya V. Hartman, “Venus in Two Acts,” *Small Axe* 12, no. 2 (2008): 14.

¹⁵ Hartman quoting Foucault, 2.

events that are often found inside a rich and intriguing ghost story. [...] Sometimes these ghastly events have no accompanying ghost stories. But, like ghost stories, we are drawn to these dark and nasty tales.”¹⁶ Leslie goes on to ruminate about why humans are drawn to tragedy, and what we can learn from it, and certainly this is the way that the chapter on Angélique is framed. In the short four-page chapter, Leslie and Krishnasamv offer a narrative surrounding the fire and unjust trial, and then contemplate the question of Angélique’s innocence, ultimately concluding that we should not focus on whether Angélique was innocent or guilty but rather what her story can illuminate to the public about the existence of slavery in Canada.¹⁷

While simply acknowledging slavery’s existence in Canadian history may seem like a low bar in terms of the goals of memorialization, there has been and continues to be a startling lack of knowledge on slavery in Canada in both public and academic circles. As late as 1999, Maureen Elgersman reported calling a prestigious Canadian library requesting information on slavery “only to be told that there had been no slavery in Canada.”¹⁸ Much of this ignorance results from the proximity of United States and the strong legacy of its slave-based economy. While colonial Canada did not have a slave-based economy, it was a society that had slavery of both Indigenous and Afro-descendant people.¹⁹ In my own experience in French immersion anglophone schools in Montreal, at the elementary and high school level, while it was mentioned that “there were slaves in Canada too,” this was not taught in any level of detail. The teaching that I received about transatlantic slavery revolved around the United States. It is therefore clear that a large part of why Angélique’s story has been considered so important in public

¹⁶ Mark Leslie and Shayna Krishnasamv, *Macabre Montreal* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2018), 189.

¹⁷ Leslie and Krishnasamv, 84-87.

¹⁸ Cuder-Dominguez, 323.

¹⁹ Cooper, 68-69.

memorialization is not simply what it can tell us about the life of Angélique, an enslaved woman in Montreal in the 18th century, but what it means for recognizing the existence of slavery in this place at all. The description of the Place Marie-Joseph Angélique's naming published in 2012 and the plaque that exists there today both make mention to the larger reality of slavery in Montreal's history that the commemoration of Angélique represents. In the 2012 report, then mayor Gérald Tremblay is quoted as saying "By designating the Place Marie-Joseph Angélique, we are making a gesture to recognize the existence of slavery in our city's history."²⁰

Thus, Angélique's legacy has served as a symbol of Canadian slavery for many. For others though, her legacy is much vaster. Namely, for Black Canadians who have surely not needed a reminder of the existence of slavery in Canada's history, Angélique represents much more. In Cooper's aforementioned engagement with Clarke's ideas about reading Angélique's court proceedings as a slave narrative, these court proceedings could be considered the first piece of black literature in Canada.²¹ Angélique's story then serves as a key component in the larger legacy of slave resistance.

One depiction of this legacy is Martine Chartrand's "Black Soul," an animated short film that shifts through images of black history, struggle, and resistance through the context of a woman sharing this history with her grandson. The style of the animation, which emulates paint on canvas, allows a seamless fluidity between images of different points in history, one of which is a portrayal of Angélique. The scene before Angélique shows a presumably enslaved man working in the fields, offering viewers a familiar depiction of slavery. The visuals then shift to show Angélique washing clothes in a wash tub, offering a scene of more domestic, urban slavery that

²⁰ "La Ville de Montréal adopte une résolution visant la désignation de la place Marie-Josèphe-Angélique." (My translation)

²¹ Cooper, 305.

some may be less familiar with. Angélique is then shown knocking over the wash tub, going to set the fire, and running away from the scene while she is chased by dogs. Finally, Angélique is pictured hanging from a noose. The fire becomes a lit torch, and viewers are swept into the next scene of a group of runaway slaves, carrying a lantern.²² In a review of the film posted to Letterboxd, one viewer of the film describes how Chartrand is able to “shape a non-linear timeline of culture and humanity in the face of absolute dehumanization” and notes how “However harrowing the impressions of the past become, the beauty of not just survival but flourishing in spite of the unmitigated mass suffering and human rights violations inflicted upon not just persons but a people [persists]. That beauty never mitigates the weight of that suffering at any point, [with] many images proving quite haunting and sobering.”²³ Angélique’s importance to the legacy of black resistance, then, is clear.



A representation of Marie-Joseph Angélique in Martine Chartrand’s “Black Soul”

On top of this larger legacy of black resistance, Marie-Joseph Angélique’s story holds significance in present popular memory because of the simple fact that she was a woman. Cooper

²² *Black Soul*, directed by Martine Chartrand (2000).

²³ Songbird Swordlily, “Black Soul,” Letterboxd, 11 October 2020, <https://letterboxd.com/skateordie002/film/black-soul/>.

notes how conceptualizing of her trial as a slave narrative is particularly impactful given the fact that the vast majority of the authors who published slave narratives in the “Black Enlightenment” of the 18th century were men.²⁴ The fact that the representation of Angélique’s enslavement in “Black Soul” is her washing clothes allows insight not only into the particularities of different kinds of enslavement beyond plantations of the American South, but also into her condition as a female slave. In contemporary academic scholarship, works such as Deborah Gray White’s *Ar’n’t I a Woman?* have defined a black feminist tradition where specific attention has been given to the way that institutions of enslavement and racial oppression specifically affected women at the intersection of gendered and racial identity. Women largely experienced sexual violence as a central factor in their enslavement, and generally were required to give more labour as they were made to work in the fields alongside men while also performing “feminine duties” such as childrearing, cooking, and cleaning.²⁵ In Alexandra Pierre’s book *Empreintes de résistance : filiations et récits de femmes autochtones, noires et racisées*, Pierre interweaves Angélique’s story with the stories of other acts of resistance by racialized women who are united by the fact that they “all share the experience of feeling out of place, the commitment to take (or retake) their right to exist, [and] the willingness that those around them and those that will follow them will be able to not only survive, but also thrive.”²⁶ Angélique’s story therefore fits not only into a larger legacy of black resistance but a specific lineage of black female resistance that today occupies not only black feminist scholars but also members of the public who place value on intersectionality in their worldviews and activism. The importance of this legacy to so many

²⁴ Cooper, 306.

²⁵ Deborah Gray White, *Ar’n’t I a woman? : female slaves in the plantation South* (New York: Norton, 1985).

²⁶ Alexandra Pierre, *Empreintes de résistance : filiations et récits de femmes autochtones, noires et racisées* (Montreal: Les Éditions du remue-ménage, 2021), 14 (My translation).

individuals makes it clear why there has been an effort to memorialize Angélique in both the academic and public spheres.

While this effort clearly exists, there still remain barriers in the public memorialization of Marie-Joseph Angélique. One of these is the fact that Angélique's legacy is tied to Montreal, a bilingual city, and therefore there can be a gap in both official records and commemoration along the axis of language. Something as simple as Angélique's name, which is spelled differently in French and in English, can function to divide searches for information in search engines and databases, something that I experienced first hand when looking for information about Place Marie-Joseph Angélique. This differentiation in spelling feels unnecessary: it is not simply a case of removing accents for ease of reading and writing in English as the English spelling still keeps the accent in her last name, and ultimately the name spelled in any way is not one claimed by Angélique but rather one that was given to her when she was baptized into the Catholic faith by those who enslaved her when she arrived in New France.²⁷ There does exist, particularly in the academic world, a decent amount of cross language scholarship. Evelyn Kolish's "L'incendie de Montréal en 1734 et le procès de Marie-Josèphe Angélique : trois oeuvres, deux interprétations" is a paper that comparatively analyses and reviews three sources on Angélique: an English book, a French book, and a bilingual website.²⁸ Cooper's *The Hanging of Angélique* draws on a myriad of English and French sources.

In terms of the public sphere, the existence of a language division is not overt, but still present. While many residents of Montreal are bilingual and information such as the square's spelling might not be a problem, there are residents who are unilingual, as well as tourists who visit the

²⁷ Cooper, 68.

²⁸ Evelyn Kolish, "L'incendie de Montréal en 1734 et le procès de Marie-Josèphe Angélique : trois oeuvres, deux interprétations," *Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française* 61, no. 1 (2007): 85-92.

city and might be less likely to encounter information about Angélique because of this division. Beyond the city itself, the existence of a film like “Black Soul,” which uses a visual medium, means that Angélique’s story can be understood by anyone. However, there are also limitations to this lack of language, as viewers of the film are not given any information such as Angélique’s name should they wish to learn more. Even something as basic as Wikipedia, a website that has become the go-to for obtaining basic information quickly, holds linguistic differences. Different linguistic versions of the same subject on Wikipedia are generally not translated from one another, they are written independently by contributors in each specific language. The English page for Marie-Joseph Angélique is much longer than the French; 2992 words to the French’s 1209. The opening blurb is much more detailed in English, noting that the name we know her by is simply one that was given to her in New France and that there has been no consensus reached on the part of historians surrounding her guilt or innocence. Equally, the English page covers the details of her trial and interpretations of her potential guilt or innocence in much more detail.²⁹ While many of the sources of the English page are French ones, such as Denyse Beaugrand-Champagne’s extensive coverage of Angélique’s trial in her book *Le procès de Marie-Josèphe-Angélique*, this does not change the fact that for members of the public who will quickly consult Wikipedia to learn who Marie-Joseph Angélique was without delving into further sources, the English page holds much more detail. This is the case with many pages on Wikipedia, presumably due to the website’s language of origin and English’s predominance as a lingua franca and second language to many, but in the case of a quick search internet search that I have described, members of the public are evidently more likely to read the page that is available in their first language.

²⁹ “Marie-Joseph Angélique,” Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marie-Joseph_Ang%C3%A9lique.

Ultimately, if we understand Angélique's legacy as the first slave narrative we have of a black woman engaging in resistance in Canada, it is clear why her memorialization has become so important to many members of the public. Her narrative offers not only a reminder of the slavery in Canadian history, but of a legacy of black, and particularly black feminist, resistance. While I have argued against an emphasis on Angélique's guilt or innocence so that we are not continuously keeping her "on trial" in our memorialization, I also understand that exploring her "guilt" can be a both useful and empowering tool in exploring the history of black resistance. But even if we reach the conclusion that she did not set the fire that she was accused of setting, we know from the court proceedings of Angélique's trial that she was an enslaved woman engaged in regular acts of resistance against her owners and the system that enslaved her.³⁰

Given this importance, is Marie-Joseph Angélique being memorialized well enough today? The chapter on Angélique in *Macabre Montreal* concludes by stating that now that a square has been named in her honour, her legacy will never be forgotten.³¹ However, given the current state of Place Marie-Joseph Angélique, I am not sure that is true. My workplace received notice recently that work on Place des Montréalaises will be stopping for the winter on December 19th and resuming in spring of 2023. The work on this square is not close to being finished, and even once it is, it is unclear how that will intersect with the square's naming and memorialization of Angélique. In some ways, I am wary of relying on municipal or state institutions to choose who we commemorate and how we commemorate them. I think that that there will be inherent nationalism in how any type of commemoration is handled by these institutions, even for a story like Angélique's. Part of the city's 2012 report of the naming of Angélique's square involves a

³⁰ Cooper, 141-175.


³¹ Leslie and Krishnasamv, 87.

self-glorifying recap of acts that the city has done to celebrate the black community's contribution to Montreal, namely celebrating Martin Luther King Jr. Day and Black History Month. And yet, city administrations hold incredible power in controlling how much historical figures are remembered by a population, particularly in terms of the naming of streets, parcs, metro stations, and other physical spaces that people navigate through and talk about every single day. It is for that reason that sharing space between Place Marie-Joseph Angélique and Place des Montréalaises feels so frustrating. Jeanne Mance, one of the women who Place des Montréalaises will memorialize, already has a major street and park named in her honour. Additionally, while the city would like us to memorialize Jeanne Mance as a co-founder of Ville-Marie, today Montreal, it neglects to highlight that that legacy of foundation is also evidently one of colonization.

While the city of Montreal's commemoration of Angélique is clouded by Quebecois and Canadian nationalism, this does not change the fact that Angélique's legacy will continue to be important to members of the public and that she will continue to be memorialized with or without municipal efforts. Afua Cooper's *The Hanging of Angélique*, while rigorously researched and written by a historian with academic training, takes the form of a more accessible text aimed at a wider audience, which has allowed it to provide both in the field of academic scholarship surrounding Angélique as well as public interest. Equally, while the city has not created any visual monuments to Angélique, there does exist a portrait of her created by street artist Miss Me, hidden in an alleyway just off of the busy Saint-Viateur street.³² When I learned of the portrait's location, I was shocked. Miss Me's piece is located just metres from my previous workplace, a restaurant where I would arrive exhausted from going out the night before on Saturday and

³² "Marie-Joséphé Angélique," Miss Me, <http://www.miss-me-art.com/mariejosephe-angelique/>.

Sunday mornings to cook brunch. Just like Angélique's plaque, I had rushed by it on my way to work hundreds of times and yet never seen it. I wonder how many of the pedestrians who frequent Saint-Viateur every day, tourists and Montreal residents alike, do not know that Angélique is tucked just around the corner. We do not have any record of a physical description of what Angélique looked like beyond "a black slave woman."³³ And yet, as I stand face to face with Miss Me's portrait, I see her.



Street Art of Marie-Joseph Angélique by Miss Me (Photo by James Stewart)

³³ Cooper, 159-160.

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Figure 1

The Plaque at Place Marie-Joseph Angélique (Photo by James Stewart)



Figure 2

A representation of Marie-Joseph Angélique in Martine Chartrand's "Black Soul"




Figure 3

Street Art of Marie-Joseph Angélique by Miss Me (Photo by James Stewart)

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***Skilfull Sorrow: How Embalming Affected The Relationship Between Americans
and Death (1861-present)***

Amelie Pelletier

At the close of the American Civil War (1861-1865), the state of the battlefields reflected the brutality and violence of the conflicts in which over 620,000 lives were lost. Because of the extraordinarily high number of casualties, government efforts to repatriate the bodies of slain soldiers to their families were often not capable of working at such a high capacity. Families in mourning were desperate to see their fathers, sons, or husbands one last time and care for their passing, and the government began reaching out to physicians and surgeons to participate in the repatriation of bodies. Many saw a lucrative opportunity in embalming bodies for preservation until they arrived at home in “good condition,” which allowed the family to undertake the necessary rituals to provide their loved ones with the necessities of the “Good Death,” a Victorian ideal of beauty that valued dying in the domesticity of home cared for by a wife, daughter, or sister. The embalming industry emerged during the Civil War and flourished in subsequent years, transforming a unique and distressing war experience into an industry that is a distinct part of American culture today. This paper investigates how embalming emerged as a practice during the Civil War, how it transformed into a lucrative industry, and how it altered the concept of death in the American consciousness. It aims to show how embalming is a quintessentially capitalist industry that was built on a marketing campaign that capitalized on the desperation of families to see their loved ones again in the midst of the bloodiest war on American soil.

As the gunpowder, dust, and blood settled in the dirt, hundreds of bodies laid lifeless, stirring at the basic human instincts of the survivors to protect the sanctity of life and provide their fellow soldiers with dignity and protecting their integrity as individuals even in death, regardless of how exhausted or overwhelmed they may be. The dead required an honorable disposal and the accompanying rituals, sociological behavior that is essential to a community, but without their family to care for the dead or even simply time and space to bury bodies, this was an arduous

challenge in the chaos of war. As the war raged on, staggering amounts of corpses littered the battlefields; over 51,000 men died at the July 1863 Battle of Gettysburg alone. Disposal of the dead became not only a basic human impulse but also a necessary activity to protect the quality of life of the area, as scavengers, the smell of decomposition, and potentially disease affected the people around the battlefield. However, the increasing number of bodies also affected the ability of survivors to appropriately and honorably bury them. In the first battles of the Civil War, being transported back home or even having a single grave, coffin, and marker was reserved for high-rank soldiers only. However, as time went on, middle-class Americans began demanding the same privileges.¹

This would prove very difficult to do, as many of the dead were being hastily buried in common graves with no clear markers. This is when state-funded and private agencies stepped in to aid. The Sanitary Commission, for example, was a large philanthropic network of agents and volunteers who assisted Northern families in finding their dead and making provisions for their journey home.² This included finding, disinterring and ensuring the safe handling of the body on its train ride back home. Safety regulations of the railroad companies required a metal coffin and eventually embalming to avoid the effects of decomposition (smell, leakage, insect activity, etc.), especially in the heat and humidity of the southern summer. Of course, embalming was also becoming desired by families as it was preferable to receive your deceased family member in a ‘lifelike state’ rather than in the unsightly late stages of decomposition.

¹ Michael L. Taylor. “The Civil War Experiences of a Louisiana Undertaker” in *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association*, Vol. 55 No. 3, Summer 2014, 266.

² The Sanitary Commission, as well as other agencies, also helped provide materials for the sick and wounded, make burial arrangements, keep death registries, and so on. Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War*. Vintage Civil War Library. Vintage Books, A Division of Random House, Inc. New York, 2008, 87.

Although agencies such as the Sanitary Commission did a lot of work to provide families with aid in retrieving their dead, most had to rely on themselves or private agents, embalmers, or undertakers, who were “finding work and profit in assisting families” to retrieve their loved ones, often far away from the battlefield and with little knowledge on how to go about this business.³ Bodies were often difficult to find as they were buried in the chaotic aftermath of battle, but with the right connections and the means to pay an agent, a family could have their loved one returned to them by train, in a metal casket, and preserved through embalming. This made the process “pragmatic, hygienic, and rational.”⁴ Then, soldiers could receive a proper grave and be disposed of with dignity and according to principles of the Good Death, and their families could find some closure.

Clearly there was a demand for end-of-life services, and many of the private agents, undertakers, and embalmers took full advantage of this. Private embalmers began to set up shop near army hospitals (in Antietam, Richmond, Gettysburg, etc.), but as business began taking off, they got “ever closer to the action” and began following army troops, the very people who may soon be on their embalming table, in their travels.⁵ There began a disturbingly aggressive marketing campaign, setting up embalming businesses near battlefields, sending representatives to the army lines to sell their services or using sentimentalism and heroism to manipulate soldiers into purchasing pre-need services, for example by handing out handbills titled “The Honored Dead” near the Richmond and Petersburg lines.⁶ Some undertakers, such as Thomas Holmes in

³ Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering*, pp.89.

⁴ Gary Laderman. *The Sacred Remains: American Attitudes Towards Death 1799-1883*. Yale University Press, 11 January 1999, pp.113

⁵ Gary Laderman. *The Sacred Remains* pp.115

⁶ Gary Laderman. *The Sacred Remains* pp.115

Washington D.C., set up displays of their embalming work, done on anonymous corpses found on the battlefield, to advertise their work. Hospital workers and authorities had to intervene because these marketing tactics were demoralizing and, to quote historian Drew Gilpin Faust, their ‘‘commodification of the dead’’ was an ‘‘unmitigated nuisance’’⁷ for everyone, forcing authorities to issue civil orders to cease these methods of advertising.

The embalmers’ efforts must have proved successful, however, as an industry arose providing embalming services to families who could afford it, or other families who were sometimes willing to go into debt to have their loved ones back and provide them with the appropriate disposal and rituals. Embalming services were very expensive, even for those of means. William Bell, of New Orleans, charged eighty dollars for embalming a private and thirty dollars for an officer by the end of the war. With the embalming, coffin, and shipping, a family could expect to pay upwards to one hundred dollars.⁸ Some embalmers who managed to establish a reputation, such as the aforementioned Thomas Holmes (the most sought-after embalmer of the Civil War), charged one hundred dollars for embalming alone. He is also known for having patented a popular solution for arterial embalming, or the replacement of blood with embalming fluid through the carotid artery. Having embalmed over four thousand soldiers during the conflict at one hundred dollars apiece, the Civil War dead made Holmes a very rich man.⁹

Some people began to take notice of the unaffordability of embalming services. A December 1862 letter sent to of the *New York Times* entitled ‘‘Embalming - A Process Practicable to All’’ denounces the ‘‘expenses of this process [...] (which) places its advantage well beyond the

⁷ Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering* pp.96

⁸ 100\$ in 1863 would amount to about 2300\$ today. Michael L. Taylor. ‘‘The Civil War Experiences of a New Orleans Undertaker’’ pp.267

⁹ Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering* pp. 94

reach of people of moderate means”, and goes further to accuse embalmers of being “extortionous (*sic*) in their charges” with “the whole matter being surrounded by professional secrecy.”¹⁰ The author, H. W. Rivers, who identified himself as a surgeon and accompanying doctor of the Ninth Army Corps, offers the recipe for embalming fluid in the *New York Times* article out of a belief that “a matter of so great utility and importance should not be monopolized”.¹¹ This editorial letter demonstrates that the practice of embalming, from its very beginning in the United States, was entrepreneurial first and compassionate second. Rivers’ concerns echoed a common frustration from families of soldiers not only because the prices were unaffordable, but also because many embalmers were being accused of questionable business practices.

In their ruthless campaign for business, many embalmers wanted to maximize their profit, sometimes at the expense of the families they claimed to serve. Undertakers and embalmers received grievances every day of false claims of prices before services to secure an individual’s business before handing them a much heavier bill once the job was done. Or, in other cases, undertakers would embalm soldiers found on the battlefield unprompted, then send a hefty bill to the family, threatening to re-bury the body otherwise.¹² Cases of extortion were so prevalent that General Ulysses Grant had to intervene and withdraw all embalmers’ permits and order them beyond the lines of the battlefield.¹³ In an ironic twist, General Grant’s body was itself the cause of a 1886 extortion lawsuit from his family to the undertakers who embalmed him, Holmes & Co., when an estimate of twenty-five dollars for the task turned into a five-hundred dollar bill. Grant’s

¹⁰ H. W. Rivers “Embalming the Dead - A Process Practicable to All” *The New York Times* (1857-1922) 26 December 1862, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, pp.6.

¹¹ H.W Rivers “Embalming the Dead”

¹² Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering* pp.98

¹³ Drew Gilpin Faust. *This Republic of Suffering* pp.98

family accused Holmes & Co. of “malicious intention to cause pain and mortification to the dead man’s family.”¹⁴ This goes to show that problematic practices of the embalming industry did not cease when the Civil War ended but permeated the profession as it flourished.

This is not to say that all undertakers of the time had evil intentions when offering their services. For example, previously mentioned William Bell of New Orleans, was said to give discounts in special cases. In a case when friends of the deceased were poor, he reduced his price from one hundred and twenty-five dollars to seventy-five dollars for full services.¹⁵ He was certainly not the only one to do such a thing, but this is overshadowed by the number of grievances filed for extortion on the battlefields of the Civil War. At City Point, Virginia, Inspector James A Hardie testified in 1864 that “scarcely a week passes that I do not receive a complaint against one or another of these embalmers”¹⁶ It is clear that embalmers’ controversial business methods were a problem for both families who felt that they were taken advantage of and military and hospital agents who needed them out of the way. Near the end of the war, on 15 March 1865, the War Department issued General Order 39, “Concerning Embalmers”, which stipulated that “no persons will be permitted to embalm or remove the bodies of deceased officers or soldiers” unless they had permits, and those licenses “will be granted to those who can furnish proof of skill and ability as embalmers.”¹⁷

¹⁴ Holmes & Co. has no relation to Thomas Holmes, mentioned previously in the essay. Issues also arose from the quality of the embalming of General Grant who was ‘deteriorating’ during his funeral travels. ‘It was Virtually Blackmailing - From the Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 22’ *New York Times (1857-1922)*; Nov 23, 1886; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times, pp. 4.

¹⁵ Michael L. Taylor. “The Civil War Experiences of a New Orleans Undertaker” pp.268

¹⁶ Quoted in Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering* pp.96

¹⁷ War Department, Adjutant General’s Office. “General Orders no.39, March 15, 1865” Hamilton K. Redway Family Papers Collection 1825-1916. Accessed from University of North Texas Digital Library, April 2022.

The licensing requirement did not deter many from doing their work, especially since it coincided with the end of the war. When the conflict ended, many medical professionals retreated to their practices, and with less people dying far from home, the need for embalming was less present. Furthermore, families were more inclined to return to their previous habits of caring for the dead themselves, in the home, requiring only perhaps the services of a coffin maker. Those who had made their career from it during the Civil War sought to transform embalming from a mostly logistical requirement into a practical and spiritual desire for their clients.

In the decades following the end of the Civil War, undertaking had become a licensed profession and became ever more professionalized, with new products entering the market and guidelines for both the practice of embalming and the heavy marketing necessary to bring embalming back as the natural inclination of families in mourning, for example. In the 1870's the professionalization of embalming was well under way, as evidenced by the publishing of the *Undertakers' Manual* in 1878¹⁸, and the 1882 first National Undertakers' Convention.

While undertakers now saw themselves as providing a professionalized essential service, they had not shed the reputation that their profession had earned during the Civil War. There had always been some discomfort with the embalming process even during the war. As a Yankee reported in following Union armies, the embalmers were like "the implacable vulture [...] their subject being drained at the neck..."¹⁹ not to mention their dubious practices following troops and the widespread extortion cases. This seemed to carry on after the war, as evidenced by a January 17, 1878 *New York Times* article titled "The Defeated Undertaker", which describes undertakers as "dangerous to society", amassing "ill-gotten wealth". The author echoes the

¹⁸ Suzanne E. Smith "To Serve the Living: Funeral Directors and the African American Way of Death." Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2010.

¹⁹ Drew Gilpin Faust *This Republic of Suffering*, pp.96

vulture imagery when he says that the undertaker “seizes upon his victims [...] and compels them to pay his charges or incur the suspicion of caring more for money than their beloved dead.”²⁰ Yet, in a 1883 article on the National Undertakers’ Convention, the attendees complained of the “heartless conduct of men who sell undertakers’ materials at ruinously low prices” and denounced that “they cannot without pain think of a homemade funeral conducted without a particle of the professional grief and skillful sorrow which only an experienced undertaker can infuse into the ceremony.”²¹ It is clear from this that a chasm has occurred between antebellum perspectives on caring for the dead and those of post-war America, as is acknowledged in the 1883 National Undertakers’ Convention,²² but there is also certainly some resistance to these new practices that may be held by families who still want to take care of their deceased loved ones in a way that won’t cost a fortune. According to *The New York Times*, a prayer for undertakers was said at an 1882 funeral in Richmond, Virginia, “a novel petition” which surprised the audience. It was said that an undertaker is “almost constantly in the presence of death, but his connection with it is purely a commercial transaction”, thus the embalmer’s life is “not favorable to piety”, which could explain the effort of prayer for his salvation²³. This is evidence of an uneasiness with the undertaker and how intimate he is with death, acknowledged as a strictly commercial motivation, as a novel profession sneaking into the lives of late-nineteenth century Americans.

²⁰ “The Defeated Undertaker”. *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. Jan 17, 1878.

²¹ “The Undertakers’ Convention” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 17 June 1883.

²² Mr. C.W Chapell, of Oneida N.Y, referred to the “progress made in the “profession” (sic) during the past quarter of a century, and drew a most striking comparison of the manner of conducting funerals then and now”. “Convention of Undertakers” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 4 June 1884.

²³ “A Prayer for the Undertaker” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 5 November 1882.

Dozens of *New York Times* articles offer insight into the questionable behavior of local funeral professionals: on 3 September 1879 “A Heartless Undertaker Punished” for swindling clients²⁴, on 4 March 1881 “A Dishonest Undertaker” who defrauded clients²⁵, on 17 April 1882 “A Neglectful Undertaker” who had kept the bodies of infants in his shed instead of burying them²⁶, and on 16 July 1885, “An Economical Undertaker” who was also accused of failing to bury the bodies of infants in order to save money.²⁷ These are just a few examples. So if from the very beginning embalmers and undertakers had an overall negative reputation, why did this new way of handling death become so prevalent? It is difficult to pinpoint when exactly the American conscience accepted embalming and giving a professional undertaker full reign of the funeral process as the status quo. It was necessary during the Civil War when death was occurring far from home, but now that peace had returned and that Americans were yet again dying at home (or at least in close proximity), why did embalming keep increasing in popularity? The answer seems to be two-fold but centered around the same theme: capitalism.

Late nineteenth-century Americans were attached to their dead and still sought to retain a connection and form of communication with them. Furthermore, the commodification of funeral services by beautification of the corpse, from the popularly attended travels of Abraham Lincoln’s embalmed body throughout the country to undertakers advertising their work by placing embalmed corpses on storefront windows, had significantly altered the American perception of the corpse.

²⁴ “A Heartless Undertaker” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 3 September 1879.

²⁵ “A Dishonest Undertaker Punished” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 4 March 1881.

²⁶ “A Neglectful Undertaker” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 17 April 1882.

²⁷ “An Economical Undertaker” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times. 16 July 1885.

As John Troyer explains in his article “Embalmed Vision”, the “mechanical modification of the dead body affected how an observer visualized the corpse [...] and came to alter the popular American understanding of how “natural” or “normal” death should appear”.²⁸ The lifelike body, seeming at rest, had profoundly marked the American psyche who sought this comfort out even without the logical necessity. These needs met with the rising industry of professionalized undertaking. As Philippe Ariès puts it, “the trappings of death occupied such a large place in the sensibility of the late nineteenth century that they became one of the most valuable and profitable objects of consumption.”²⁹ In an increasingly capitalist society, many individuals joined together their need to honor their dead with a desire to display their means and social status. In an August 1901 article to the *New York Times* aptly titled “Death Pays Some Men”, a Jacksonville, Florida undertaker explains that “it is surprising the amount of money that is squandered in this particular, especially when it is known that it cannot possibly benefit the dead. Of course, it is done for purely sentimental reasons”. This is fair, but the example he gives of a wealthy widow who spent over three thousand dollars on her husband’s funeral (which would amount to around one hundred and three thousand dollars today), suggests that showing one’s wealth may have something to do with it as well.³⁰ The undertaker who wrote those words also explained that the average funeral racked up a bill of 700\$ to 800\$ (about 25 000\$ today) which he says is practically all clear profit.

It has already been established that undertakers made their business first by aggressive marketing near battlefields, then by making storefront displays to attract customers and newspaper

²⁸ John Troyer. “Embalmed Vision” in *Mortality* Vol 12 No.1, 2007, pp.22-47

²⁹ Philippe Ariès. “Death Denied, The Case of America” in *The Hour of Our Death: The Classic History of Western Attitudes Toward Death Over the Last One Thousand Years*. (Second Vintage Books Edition, June 2008, pp. 558).

³⁰ “Death Pays Some Men” *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspaper: The New York Times. 18 August 1901.

ads. However, either because of the bad reputation they had built around the profession or because the profession itself was evolving, undertakers had to find new avenues to capitalize on. Emphasis was placed on the morality of the funeral director, as explicitly stated in the 1884 deontological code of the newly formed National Undertakers' Association.³¹ The deontological code began associating itself more with the spiritual needs of the mourners and doing what Ariès calls "exploiting neglected psychological needs" and "capitalizing on the advice of the psychologists of mourning,"³² which was a response to the emphasis that psychologists since Freud were placing on the natural necessity of mourning within a community which the increasing middle-class urban life was not providing to survivors.³³ Undertakers (who would come to be known as funeral directors) took upon themselves to serve as grief counselors and in many aspects took over clergy and health professionals in caring for the dead and the survivors. This seems to have been an in-demand service, as many articles from the *New York Times* announce people ill or dying from grief³⁴ and many poems on the subject of grief were published in the same time period.³⁵

However, there is a problematic discrepancy between counseling the bereaved in their most vulnerable moment and the for-profit sale of funeral products and services to said bereaved. This is an issue that snowballed well into the twentieth century and came to a climax when Jessica Mitford released her extremely successful book *The American Way of Death* in 1963, an exposé on the "unscrupulous sales practices" "facilitating the plunder of the next-of-kin" that she

³¹ Philippe Ariès "Death Denied: The Case of America" pp.598

³² Philippe Ariès "Death Denied: The Case of America" pp. 598

³³ Philippe Ariès "Death Denied: The Case of America" pp.598

³⁴ Take, for example, "Mrs Conant Dies of Grief" *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspaper: The *New York Times*. 29 March 1906.

³⁵ Take, for example, "The Way of Grief" *New York Times* (1857-1922) ProQuest Historical Newspaper: The *New York Times*. 18 March 1903.

believes American funeral directors are guilty of.³⁶ She denounces the commercialization and exorbitant prices of funeral services imposed on the bereaved through the sentimentality angle of manipulation from funeral directors. Her work had an important impact on the American populace, having sold out on the day it was released and topping the New York Times Bestseller List and remaining on it for the whole year.³⁷ The release of her book caused a ripple effect of questioning consumerism culture as it exists in the funeral industry, but it was not enough to incur real change. Still today, a funeral in North America will cost around five to ten thousand dollars, no small amount for anyone, but especially challenging for families of lower means.³⁸ Furthermore, there is still evidence of devious sales practices from funeral practitioners to this day.³⁹ It would seem that by its nature, the association of vulnerability in a person's most difficult moments and the desire for profit may generate an awkward tip-toeing around right and wrong, and this line has often been crossed from the beginning of embalming dead bodies in North America to this day.

The American Civil War and its particularly high number of casualties was a conflict that profoundly changed American civilization. One aspect that is often overlooked is the challenge to take care of the high numbers of dead bodies that the battles of this war generated. As the conflict got bloodier, the number of victims made it difficult to provide decent burials, and families' desires to take care of their dead required long train rides and generated the necessity to preserve bodies to halt the process of decomposition. The demand for embalming services created by this situation

³⁶ Jessica Mitford. "The American Way of Death Revisited". First Vintage Books Edition, 2000, pp. 17.

³⁷ David Robson. "The Woman Who Forced Us To Look Death In The Face". BBC Future, 21 July 2016.

³⁸ Kaitlyn Kokosa "How much does a funeral cost? (2022)" in Policy Advisor, 18 November 2021. Accessed 11 April 2022. <https://www.policyadvisor.com/magazine/how-much-does-a-funeral-cost/>

³⁹ Take, for example: Pat Faran. "Funeral homes using high pressure sales tactics amid COVID-19 pandemic, new report finds" CTV News Toronto. 7 December 2020. Accessed 11 April 2022 <https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/funeral-homes-using-high-pressure-sales-tactics-amid-covid-19-pandemic-new-report-finds-1.5221044?cache=yes%3FclipId%3D8983>

developed into a full industry that advertised their services by joining army bands to await their demise or setting up shop near battlefields for the same reason. This became a problem resulting in their ban from battlefields due to complaints of extortion and financial abuse of clients. Yet this pattern endured even after the Civil War. Efforts to require licensing and the professionalization of embalming did not deter some undertakers from devious practices for profit. However, the Civil War's popularization of embalming transformed the concept of a 'natural' or 'normal' death in the American psyche and was comforting to families, thus the practice carried on. It evolved along with capitalism, and became status quo in the twentieth century, most likely as a result of the rise of materialism, capitalist desire for social display of wealth, and because undertakers were increasingly taking it upon themselves to use psychological grief studies as sale tactics. There were some efforts to change the status quo, especially in Jessica Mitford's 1963 book 'The American Way of Death', but overall, the funeral industry is still made up of multinational corporations charging immensely high prices for their services, and still using questionable techniques to make profit.

The business of embalming is exactly that, a business. Grief in America (and Canada as an extent) has been associated with a hefty bill added to an already difficult process. In recent years, an effort has been made to offer alternatives to families with lesser means or families not interested in the now 'traditional' method of funeral rites, such as non-for-profit funeral homes or green burial cemeteries (no embalming and natural materials only going in the ground). Grief support has extended with the aid of social media (such as support groups and forums) and the progress of the healthcare system, especially concerning mental health. Death and dying discourse are now widely practiced on the internet, with death podcasts, books, YouTube channels, and social media accounts giving individuals a platform on which to discuss death practices and explore alternatives

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to traditional funeral practices, denounce funeral directors and funeral homes who provided bad experiences to their customers, and overall cultivate a “death positivity” rhetoric. As the experience of death, dying, and grief is in constant evolution, it is interesting to attempt to anticipate the future of funeral rites as technology evolves, businesses are pressured into more socially-conscious practices due to their exposure in the media and the revival of do-it-yourself culture. Either way, death practices will always be a direct reflection of what a society values and how it cares about its own people, and the history of embalming in America raises some important questions about these very concepts.

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**Unraveling the Enigma: Exploring the Origins, Significance, and Misconceptions of Celtic
Christianity**

Indiana "Indy" Kirchner

"Indy" Kirchner is an enthusiastic and dedicated undergraduate student at Concordia University, currently in her second year of studying history. With a deep passion for the subject, she is particularly interested in Canadian history and is always eager to expand her knowledge in this area. In fact, after completing her Bachelor of History degree, she plans to continue her academic pursuits at McGill University in the Master of Arts in Teaching and Learning program, where she hopes to further develop her skills and expertise in the field of education. Apart from her academic pursuits, Indiana is someone who finds joy in a variety of things. She has a keen interest in film and loves spending time with her friends. Additionally, Indiana is an avid traveler and is always on the lookout for new adventures and experiences. Professionally, Indiana works as an integration aid for several high schools in Montreal, where she is able to share her passion for education with students and help them succeed academically. She hopes to pursue a career in the field of education and make a positive impact in the lives of young people.

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Celtic Christianity is a form of Christianity practiced in the Celtic region. While this definition describes ‘Celtic Christianity’ in its simplest form, there are several complications that arise with ‘Celtic Christianity.’ In this essay, we will examine three key topics that will help readers better understand these difficulties. Through an analysis of what the term ‘Celtic’ means, one can better examine the issues that arise when linking both ‘Celtic’ and ‘Christianity’ together, and finally, through analyzing the label ‘Celtic Christianity,’ we better understand the inherent struggles associated with the use of this terminology. As a well-known and historical form of Christianity, it is crucial to explore these topics, their origins and their meanings. Throughout this essay, we will also encounter some current discourse revolving around the issues covered, therefore enforcing the relevancy of these topics to the readers of today.

To better understand why the label ‘Celtic’ is problematic, one must better understand what its definition is. Many people would consider someone from or living in the Celtic Isles as, ‘Celtic.’ However, depending on whom you ask and when you ask, the definition of what ‘Celtic’ means varies significantly. In a text by Barry Cunliffe, he mentions that Greco-Roman encounters with the ‘Celtic peoples’ led to the generalization of ‘Celts’ being synonymous with barbarian.¹ Cunliffe explains how the view of the ‘Celtic’ people has evolved with them first being viewed as the noble savages then becoming the “dwellers in the north-western,” and so on. This provides readers with a sense of how dramatically the view of who and what ‘Celtic’ is has shifted through the ages just in the perspective of the Greco-Romans. As mentioned, the meaning of the word ‘Celtic’ has held multiple meanings, many believe that originally the term ‘Celtic’ ‘was used to describe a group of languages throughout the British Isles and nearby regions,

¹ Cunliffe, B. (2003). So, Who Were the Celts? *The Celts: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, 139-145. Pg. 140

another example of the fluidity and impermanence of the definition. There are few instances where the definition of what ‘Celtic’ means differs drastically. Today the true meaning of ‘Celtic’ is still up for debate. We commonly categorize ‘Celtic’ as an ethnicity, culture, or linguistic group originating in what is known as the Celtic region. However, the true meaning still holds some ambiguity. Essentially, the reason why there is difficulty surrounding ‘Celtic’ is due to the vagueness of the term. It is also simple to understand the negative underlying connotation the term shares with “barbarian” or “noble savage.” This association leaves a bitter taste regarding the title ‘Celtic,’ adding to the complications around the term.

As observed, the term ‘Celtic’ remains somewhat ambiguous still, and its meaning is highly dependent on context. However, in this argument of the difficulties linking ‘Celtic’ and ‘Christianity,’ assume the term ‘Celtic’ as the more modern approach, meaning the culture surrounding the people of the Celtic region from the Middle Ages to today. Before the arrival of Roman Christianity in the Celtic region, the Celts had their own rich cultural identity and pagan religion. Many of these cultural aspects had amalgamated into Christianity, thus forming ‘Celtic Christianity’ as we know it. The issues in linking ‘Celtic’ and ‘Christianity’ rely heavily on how different ‘Celtic Christianity’ is from ‘Roman Christianity.’ Both branches of Christianity share certain aspects but also differ in a multitude of ways as well. Monasticism, tonsures, and the date of Easter are just a few of many significant differences that distinguish the practices of the two Christian denominations. One notable practice that differentiates the Celtic strain of Christianity from ‘Roman Christianity’ is the concept of peregrination. This concept is the tradition of Celtic Monks leaving their homes in search of solitude to purge themselves of sins. What makes this practice so important besides its unique nature? In an article by Phyllis Jestice, she explains that the practice is an Irish phenomenon in which the abandonment of one's family and home is one

of the greatest sacrifices one can make to God.² Especially since the Irish or ‘Celts’ felt such a deep attachment to their homeland, again emphasizing the authenticity and feeling of cultural identity to the Celtic religion or culture that we do not see with Roman-Catholic practices. While these are some significant differences, many distinctions can be observed. In conclusion, the difficulty linking ‘Celtic’ and ‘Christianity’ lies in the significant differences that divide ‘Celtic Christianity’ from traditional ‘Roman Christianity.’

Finally, we shall explore the complications involved by using the term ‘Celtic Christianity’ in and of itself. Why is this a complicated term? ‘Celtic Christianity’ is a culturally developed and historic branch of Christianity. Brought over by the Romans, Christianity had begun to spread throughout the Isles, developing its own complex cultural identity. This evolution of Christianity thoroughly began to distinguish itself. However, it is essential to understand that ‘Celtic Christianity’ is a blend of not only Celtic, but a multitude of cultures. Consequently, ‘Celtic Christianity’ possesses a unique identity amongst the various versions of Christianity. In a sense, the religion cannot be seen as authentically Celtic or Christian due to its blended nature. Celtic culture has an immense influence on the form of Christianity practiced in places where Celtic culture reigned supreme, it even preserved some of the Celtic, pre-Christian traditions and culture into what ultimately became what we call today ‘Celtic Christianity.’ For example, in an essay by Oliver Davies (1999), he mentions the fascination of triads that the Celts had predated the introduction of Christianity but remained a prevalent symbol in ‘Celtic Christianity (p.15).’³ This information emphasizes the uniqueness of ‘Celtic Christianity.’ Traces of cultures from outside the Isles can even be found in the Celtic-influenced form of Christianity,

² Phyllis G. Jestice. and Kate O'Day. 2000. *Encyclopedia of Irish Spirituality*. Santa Barbara, Calif. Pg.1

³ Davies, O. (1999). *An Introduction to Celtic Christianity; The Concept of a Celtic Spirituality; and The Origins of Celtic Christianity, Celtic Spirituality*, New York, and Mahwah: Paulist Press, 3-15 pg. 15

and this is a contributor to it being a unique blend of culture and religion. Davies references some Congolese influence translated to 'Celtic Christianity.'⁴ In essence, what makes 'Celtic Christianity' such a complicated term is its combination of Celtic cultures and Roman Christianity. While in this argument, we use 'Celtic' or 'Celtic culture' as a blanket statement regarding all things regarding the people of the Celtic Isles, there are many hindrances regarding the true meaning of that term. In conclusion, difficulties surround the use of the term 'Celtic Christianity.' While we do have a vague understanding of the term, we must be circumspect in its use and aware of the shortcomings in its utility as a term. It is through an analysis of the term that it becomes clear that there are many complications related to its use. One must be cognizant of the problems that arise with using the terminology of 'Celtic Christianity,' in the linking of 'Celtic' to 'Christianity,' and the issues related to the literal meaning of the word 'Celtic.' Through the discussion above readers can better understand these issues. It is crucial to research these difficulties and try to make sense of them through discourse and research due to 'Celtic Christianity' being such an important part of Irish and Celtic history. With this debate still occupying many who research and are experts on Irish and Celtic history, it is clear that these ideas revolving around the meaning of 'Celtic Christianity' the lack of a unified understanding even amongst, make research on the topic even more important than ever.

⁴ Ibid. pg. 15

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Changing Relations: Narratives of Intercommunal Violence in the Bosnian War

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Penelope Higgins is a student in the BA Honours in History program and will be beginning her fourth year of studies in the fall. She is motivated to study the past for the insights it can provide towards better understanding and responding to the changing conditions of the present world. She takes a particular interest in the history and theory of political economy as well as social and cultural histories of film, sexuality, and gender. Her recent research includes a study of trans panic narratives and cold war nationalism in '70s film and an archival study of the 1980s Black Montreal newspaper AFRO-CAN in the context of Canadian Multiculturalism policies and neoliberalism. She hopes to work next on the deindustrialization of Quebec and North America to better understand contemporary Canadian political economy in a global context. After graduation she is considering pursuing an MA in history or training in archival studies and would love to work in heritage or museums facilitating access to historical knowledge for public audiences. In her spare time, she enjoys working with textile art, making lace using historical techniques, lying in the shade during the summer heat, and exploring the many overlapping eras and cultural influences of Montreal's infrastructure, architecture, and material culture.

In their depictions of the Bosnian war, Chuck Sudetić and Tone Bringa document how peaceful social relations between neighbours in Bosnian communities break apart and turn violent as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia dissolves. In *Blood and Vengeance* (1998), Sudetić situates the local conflicts of the Bosnian war in the region's political and economic histories. He shows how historical memory influences the escalation of violence, shaped by the economic and political motives of powerful nationalists. In "We Are All Neighbours" (1993), Bringa shows how the arrival of nationalist military occupation in a Bosnian village divides a community's safety along ethnic and religious lines, though without providing enough historical or geopolitical context to enrich the documentation. In contrast, Sudetić provides historical context, but the effectiveness of his narrative is coloured by his bias against Serbia, and his attempts to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia leaves out important international economic factors. This analysis of the two sources will first focus on their greatest strengths and subsequently critique the ways they omit key information.

In *Blood and Vengeance*, Sudetić provides a multi-layered account of the outbreak of violence in Bosnia, focusing simultaneously on the progression of events at both community and national levels. His narrative shows how historical memory of inter-ethnic violence ignites fear and hostility among neighbours in a way shaped by the region's changing political economy of and the actions of powerful nationalist war profiteers. He shows that the men who stand to gain the most from the conflicts actively mobilize fear of the return of intercommunal violence to garner support for their radical nationalist political projects: "living memories were stirred as the Communist world collapsed ... [and] a small group of men bent on taking and keeping personal

power ignited its passions and blew a country apart.”¹ Sudetić narrates how war profiteers emerge through the economic collapse of Yugoslavia that produces radical redistributions of wealth: “wages plummeted. Workers pretended to work and pilfered whatever they could grab. The government pretended to govern. Managers of giant public enterprises and generals in the army embezzled as much as their Swiss and Austrian and Cypriot bank accounts could hold.”² Sudetić shows how key figures in the war seek economic gain, explaining, for instance, how Milošević, upon gaining political leadership, moved quickly to assert control over “Serbia’s richest region,” Vojvodina.³ Sudetić explains that as Yugoslavia collapses leaders no longer try to claim that they are working for the collective benefit of the federation and openly turn to violent, nationalist rhetoric. He emphasizes how Milosević delivers a threatening and ethnonationalist speech at the 600th anniversary ceremony of the battle of Kosovo, and recounts how the Serbian state media subsequently foment fear by suggesting that a return of past violence against Serbs is coming.⁴ This fearmongering inspires a rise in Serbian ethnonationalism and support for the coming war for the partition of Bosnia.

Sudetić also narrates how war profiteering shapes the escalation of violence at the local level with the key role of the arms dealers Murat and Avdija Šabanović, who become leaders of vigilante paramilitary groups in the Višegrad and Kupusovići region. He notes that the Šabanović brothers and local Serbian nationalists are more than willing to do business together across ethnic divisions because of the mutual profit to be had in the arms trade as tensions rise and war looms.⁵

¹ Chuck Sudetić, *Blood and Vengeance: One Family’s Story of the War in Bosnia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), xxxviii.

² Sudetić, *Blood and Vengeance*, 75-76.

³ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 78-80.

⁵ “The Serbs knew that the Šabanović brothers were dealing and distributing guns to Muslims all over the district. They knew this because the Serbs were selling guns to the Šabanović brothers... The local Serb leaders sold the

Sudetić depicts how the Šabanović brothers respond to local Serbian nationalist demonstrations and troop mobilizations by gathering local Muslims and organizing paramilitary attacks against the Serbs.⁶ Following these events, when a local community meeting is called, local Serbs express their fears that local Muslims have hidden weapons from WWII and suggest that further violence can be prevented if everyone works together to keep their community safe. Sudetić explains that, while many of the Muslim men have no desire for violence, the return of violent nationalism prevents them from being able to trust their Serb neighbours, and a peace agreement is not reached.⁷ Through the rest of his account, Sudetić continues to emphasize the economic nature of war, noting that, when the wartime destruction and international sanctions begin to create extreme mass poverty and hunger, constant looting occurs and how enlisting as a soldier provides access to food and money.⁸ The fear and trauma from historical violence are also continuously reignited by new massacres, and peaceful people are driven to act by the tragedies endured in war.⁹ In Sudetić's war, poverty and desperation enable profit, profit is justified by fear, fear begets violence, violence begets further poverty, further fear, and further violence. A cycle is unleashed that is organic and evolves beyond any one person or group's control, but it is unleashed and shaped by the actions of the powerful and wealthy nationalists who stand to materially gain from violence against other ethnic groups and the expansion of national territory.

Muslims guns because there was a lot of money in it and because they coveted money more than they needed guns." Ibid., 90.

⁶ Ibid., 90-91.

⁷ Sudetić, *Blood and Vengeance*, 92-93.

⁸ "The Serb gunmen made off with whatever they could carry. Gold watches and rings. Cash. Washing machines. Televisions. Anything." Ibid., 120. "Soldiers, officers, and civilian members of the work brigades pilfered food for their own families, hiding sacks of flour in snow drifts and carrying them by night through the woods to their homes." Ibid., 178.

⁹ "A Muslim soldier seeking revenge for the death of a relative, a military-police chief killed near Skelani, had used the butt of his revolver to smash the skulls of a Serb man and his elderly mother." Ibid., 172

In contrast with Sudetić's historically grounded portrait of the Bosnian war, Bringa's and Christie's documentary "We Are All Neighbours" presents a locally focused documentation of the outbreak of violence in a village near Sarajevo. Bringa's narration and interviews focus on the relationships between neighbours and how the villagers feel relative to one another as the peace that had remained in their town despite the war outside finally begins to fracture. The documentary shows that shared need for collective security against external violence dissolves as the Croat nationalist forces occupy the village and Muslims and Catholics try to calculate how they can stay safe when their needs are divided along the ethnic borders of the nationalists.

At the film's beginning the villagers share resources and community and describe relations across religions as good. Nusreta, a Muslim woman, explains that "no sane person would commit atrocities here because we have to live here together."¹⁰ Bringa notes how the proposed UN *Vance Owen Peace Plan* is making the villagers nervous because it would divide Bosnia into ten provinces separated along ethnic lines.¹¹ The film shows how the neighbouring community of Kiseljak has been divided under the military control of the nationalist Croat defence force. Muslim shops have been targeted with violence and only Catholic women feel safe enough to trade at the outdoor market.¹² Sabina, one of the young Muslim women in the village who works in Kiseljak, describes the growing fear and panic that everyone feels as a result of the war and how it makes people turn inwards away from each other.¹³ As a Muslim refugee in the village tells Nusreta of the massacres she has fled, Nusreta begins to express fear that inter-ethnic conflict will break out in her home village soon too.¹⁴ The town is not yet

¹⁰ Debbie Christie and Tone Bringa, "We Are All Neighbours," (London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1993), 3:00.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 12:00-13:00.

¹² *Ibid.*, 22:45-23:10

¹³ *Ibid.*, 23:55.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 27:20.

occupied by a nationalist military force, and at this point Nusreta continues to emphasize that inter-ethnic conflict would harm their community because everyone will have to live together afterwards. Bringa explains that people are fleeing conflict in various directions now because “nobody is clear where is safe anymore.”¹⁵ People such as Nusreta begin to guess that territories that would be allotted to their own ethnic group under the *Vance Owen Plan* may be the safest places for them. The film shows that Catholics in a village like Slavka are now also unsure of the safety of their village, as their family members, who have been attacked by Muslim soldiers, begin arriving in town.¹⁶ As the Croat nationalist forces begin to seize military control of the village, the film shows that the villagers, no longer sure that intercommunal relationships are safe, divide themselves by their ethnicities. The film emphasizes the degree to which the conditions necessary for safety have shifted dramatically, explaining that the Croat army has forbidden more than three men to gather in a public place, a ban that prevents people from accessing food supplies and that makes gathering for prayer dangerous.¹⁷ Bringa explains how at this point in the conflict ethnic and religious identity among the villagers become more important, reinforced by the dangers of the military occupation.¹⁸ The film does not capture the beginning of violence in the village, but returns after eight weeks to show that the Muslims of the village have been driven out, some have been killed, and all of their houses have been destroyed by the Croat soldiers who began shelling the village on Easter Sunday.¹⁹ Some of the Muslims were killed by their own neighbours from within the village community.²⁰ The film shows how because of this violence the Muslims among the victims now see no possibility for peaceful

¹⁵ Ibid., 29:35

¹⁶ Ibid., 32:30

¹⁷ Ibid., 38:00-39:00.

¹⁸ Ibid., 45:15-46:35.

¹⁹ Ibid., 53:30.

²⁰ Ibid., 56:35.

inter-ethnic community in the village.²¹ Bringa's narration and interview questions are most effective in showing how the fluid ethnic differences in the village solidify and sever relationships when the nationalist forces ensure that villagers can no longer count on safety ensured by their unity.

"We Are All Neighbours" is an effective document of the way that ethnonationalist war interrupts intercommunal desires for peace by forcing people to adapt to changed material conditions. Despite these strengths, Bringa offers no historical or geopolitical context for the war or the dynamics that emerge in the town. The film does not mention the regions' feudal past, nor its colonization by the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires.²² Neither does the film mention the fascist nationalist massacres committed by people of all ethnicities and religions under Nazi occupation.²³ Bringa's film does not explore whether there is a local history of intercommunal violence in the village of the kind that occurred in many similar small Bosnian communities (e.g., the massacres in Kulen Vakuf in during WWII).²⁴ She does not explain the context of the economic and political collapse of communism that led to the Bosnian war. Bringa's documentary deeply humanizes the people of the village regardless of their ethnicities, but by leaving out the historical context of the Bosnian war, the film gives the viewer no clues as to why ethnicity and religion are dividing lines, thus leaving these collective categories unquestioned. Because of this lack of historical context, "We Are All Neighbours" ultimately cannot convey the degree to which social relationships do not change randomly during war, but rather are shaped by innumerable factors specific to each conflict.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 57:20.

²² Max Bergholz, "Historical Background and the Birth of the First Yugoslavia," September 12, 2022.

²³ Sabrina P. Ramet, "Chapter 4: World War Two and the Partisan Struggle 1941-1945," in *The Three Yugoslavias: Statebuilding and Legitimation, 1918-2005*, (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), 113-163.

²⁴ Max Bergholz, "War, Genocide, and Communist Revolution, 1941-1945," October 3, 2022.

In contrast with “We Are All Neighbours,” *Blood and Vengeance* succeeds in showing how local conflicts are constantly shaped by their broader historical contexts locally, nationally, and globally. There is relatively little to critique, given the extraordinary ambition and complexity of the interwoven narratives of family, war profiteers and prominent nationalists, soldiers, the international political climate, the United Nations, and NATO. The weaknesses in *Blood and Vengeance* are visible in relation to the text’s polemical quality: Sudetić writes to reveal the profound failures of international organizations during the war and to indict the brutality of the Serbian ethnonationalism under Milošević and his allies. Given that Sudetić emphasizes how deeply international political and economic organizations shape the war through sanctions imposed on Serbia and the arms embargo on Bosnia, his narrative would be strengthened by an explanation of the international factors in Yugoslavia’s economic collapse. Sudetić explains the economic crises of Yugoslavia as the result of internal mismanagement by the Communist Party and internal nationalist economic tensions. He leaves out the crucial role of international financial capitalism in crippling the Yugoslav economy and the interventionist role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He does not explain the recall on massive loans to Yugoslavia that Western capitalist banks instituted during the second OPEC crisis in 1979 or mention that Yugoslavia was one of many developing countries whose economies were gutted by the instabilities and predatory practices of international market capitalism.²⁵ He also doesn’t address the history of the IMF’s attempts to pressure Yugoslavia to adopt economic restructuring policies in exchange for credits to repay their debts. He does not mention that the IMF struggled to obtain the results it hoped for because of economic decentralization in the federal structure of the Yugoslav state.²⁶ While not necessarily deliberate, there is a causal relationship between the

²⁵ Max Bergholz, “The Crisis of Legitimacy and the Awakening of Serbia,” November 7, 2022.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

disastrous effects of western capitalist lending practices and the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s. I would argue that these must be considered an important factor in the analysis of the wars. The wars quickly resulted in the dissolution of the decentralized socialist economy of federal Yugoslavia and its reconstitution into separately governed IMF member states.²⁷ With the wartime economic dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, the IMF could begin to negotiate directly with the independent states for the implementation of structural adjustment programs, unhindered by the structure of the Yugoslav state. It could be argued that the IMF, a United Nations agency, therefore had interests that conflicted with the UN's central mandate to help achieve and maintain peace in the region.²⁸ This historical factor would be especially important for Sudetić's political and economic narrative, given that the Yugoslav wars of succession resulted in the widespread shift to neoliberal economic policies in the region's new independent states.²⁹

Sudetić's account also falters in its clear bias against Serbian people that colours his interpretation of events, as in this claim: "Before their eyes, Slovenes, Croats, Muslims, and other Yugoslavs, saw the reincarnation of the Serb hegemony and police thuggery that had radicalized Yugoslavia in the 1930s and presaged the bloodbath of World War II."³⁰ While Sudetić has understandable reasons for his perspective, especially in telling the stories of his Bosnian Muslim family whose lives were torn apart by the Bosnian war, such statements under-

²⁷ Prior to the wars of the 1990s the Yugoslavia was a member of the IMF as a federal state but on December 14, 1992 in the middle of the ongoing conflicts Yugoslavia ceased to be a member and was replaced by five independent former Yugoslav member nations. Imf.org, "List of Members' Date of Entry," International Monetary Fund. <https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm>.

²⁸ While I arrived at these inferences by reasoning through the facts presented in our lectures and readings, other scholars have made similar arguments. See Susan L. Woodward, "The Political Economy of Ethno-Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Socialist Register* vol. 39 (2003): 73-92.

²⁹ Gareth Dale and Adam Fabry, "Neoliberalism in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union," in *The SAGE Handbook of Neoliberalism* ed. Damien Cahill et al., (London: SAGE Publication, 2018) 234-248.

³⁰ Sudetić, *Blood and Vengeance*, 78.

emphasize the degree to which radical and fascistic violence in Yugoslavia in the 1930s was perpetrated by people of many ethnicities.³¹ Sudetić does not omit factual evidence explaining the history of ethnically motivated violence against Serbs in Yugoslavia, but his bias suggests that his analysis may miss or underemphasize factors that might be interpreted differently by other writers and scholars.

Both of these very different sources have shortcomings, but ultimately *Blood and Vengeance* and “We Are All Neighbours” each provide vital documentation of the Bosnian war. A comparative study of the two works shows the possibility of theorizing the political economy of the Bosnian war and the Yugoslav wars of succession as a process of enclosure. The conflicts are messy and multi-faceted and cannot be reduced to economic determinism, but there are patterns that emerge in the way that the economic relations of the war shaped the conflict. At the level of state and capital, the Bosnian war and its related conflicts involved the massive redistribution of wealth and property into the hands of a few, and the creation of a new wartime bourgeoisie with military and political power. The wars were fought over the division of territory, meaning that they were competing enclosures of land, deciding where and how state borders would regulate the presence and movement of people and trade. At the local level, for those lumpenized by war, collective and common desires, material needs, and possibilities for cooperation and peace were fractured and enclosed within the ethnic boundaries created by the ideological and military borders of warring nationalists. In Brubaker’s language, the war profiteers engage in group-making as a political and military project which resulted in processes of group-formation among civilians.³² Above all, the study of the Bosnian war reveals that thirty years on, the events that

³¹ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 79-113.

³² Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity Without Groups*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

historiae

destroyed so many lives still have much to teach all who hope to work for peaceful relations between peoples.

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The Co-creation of Violence

Canadian Policing Tactics in Palestine and Barriere Lake

Freja Chapman

Freyja Stella Chapman is a third year student in history and women's studies. They just enrolled in the honours essay option and are hoping to focus on the abolition of the death penalty in Canada. They are fueled by rage at the way Canadian history was taught in their highschool, and they hope to be able to teach it in a more truthful and critical way someday. Outside of school they're a climate activist, and someone who likes to harass everyone they know into playing soccer with them. Other than that, they love to sit in the sun, drink juice, and pretend to be Italian.

There has been a growing body of scholarship in recent years focusing on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) as a testing place for tactics and technologies of military and police domination, and as a nexus of global patterns of violence. Rhys Machold has called this the “laboratory thesis” and has critiqued it for its overemphasis of Israel's role in militarized violence around the world, reminding readers that policing tactics are being tested and perfected in military conflicts and interventions in contested territories worldwide.¹ Israel and the OPT's relationship with police violence in the rest of the world is not a one way street. As much as Israeli security firms are selling technologies marketed to be “Tested in Gaza”, and foreign governments are explicitly copying their tactics of surveillance and population control², their government is also receiving billions of dollars in military aid every year, most notably from the United States³. These inter-governmental exchanges are symbiotic. What I hope to prove in this paper is that the Canadian state is much more involved in this exchange than most people are aware of, and that our ignorance to this fact is very much by design.

The bulk of Canada's contribution to the project of Israeli colonization since the 2007 Paris Conference has been in propping up the international legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA) -so long as it was not led by Hamas- and providing funding, training, and infrastructure to their police and security forces.⁴ The total funds allocated by the Canadian

¹ Rhys Machold, “Reconsidering the laboratory thesis: Palestine/Israel and the geopolitics of representation,” *Political Geography* 65 (2018): 89, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.04.002>

² Jeff Halper, *War Against the People: Israel, the Palestinians and Global Pacification* (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 143.

³ Sharp, Jeremy M, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel*, CRS Report No. RL33222, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2022), 2, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf>.

⁴ Jeffrey Monaghan, “Security development and the Palestinian Authority: an examination of the ‘Canadian factor,’” *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no. 2 (2016): 127, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2016.1153310>.

government to this project (the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan, or PRDP) is far lower than other contributors such as the EU, the US or Saudi Arabia, but have been specifically targeted on the niche of ‘justice’ and ‘security’ sector reforms.⁵ After diving into the historical context of the Paris Conference and the Palestinian Authority, I will examine how exactly the CAD\$300 million⁶ Canada pledged to this project has been used, and then turn to a comparison between the tactics that Canadian police and military are teaching in the OPT, and the tactics that they are using against Indigenous people domestically.

Specifically, I will focus on the case of the Algonquins of Barriere Lake and the combined response of the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to their highway blockades and occupations of government buildings throughout 2008/2009 in response to Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) refusing to recognize their traditional governance system and imposing third-party management on the nation.⁷ The vilification of sovereigntists as ‘terrorists’, the recognition of self-government only when it upholds the desires of the settler state, and the tools of militarized policing, surveillance, and isolation of territory are some of the tactics employed by the Canadian state in both Algonquin and Palestinian territory.

In examining the similarities between these two cases, it becomes clear that histories of policing can never really be bound to one nation-state. Through this comparison I hope to highlight Canada’s often downplayed role in global violence, and challenge the notion that Israel

⁵ Monaghan, “Security development,” 127.

⁶ Ibid, 128.

⁷ Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements: Dissent and the Security State*, (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2018), 34.

is only an exporter of colonial policing tactics, because it has certainly imported its fair share from the Canadian state and security apparatus.

The laboratory thesis and its limitations

At its core, the laboratory thesis is about “making sense of Israel’s perceived centrality in global patterns of violence and militarism.”⁸ This perception is not only a scholarly one. The struggle for Palestinian liberation is held up in the eyes of many, at least Canadian, activists as one with the potential to upend colonial hegemony worldwide. Perhaps since Israel is a relatively newer colonial project than most, the violence used to secure its borders and the tactics used to suppress Palestinian resistance have held the spotlight, both in the popular imagination and in scholarships of domination. It is not without good reason that Israel wears this badge of violent honour, as the global testing ground for technologies of military and police repression. Since the 1967 arms embargo imposed by France, Israel’s weapons industry has grown on an exponential scale.⁹ Even excluding the private security firms who make a fortune marketing their goods as “Approved by the IDF,”¹⁰ the Israeli defense department itself exports billions of dollars in military technology to other states. In 2021 that number rose by 30% to \$11.3 billion.¹¹ This is surely a significant contribution to the cause of violence worldwide, but plenty of wealthy

⁸ Machold, “Reconsidering the laboratory thesis,” 88.

⁹ Ibid, 91.

¹⁰ Jeff Halper, *War Against the People: Israel, the Palestinians and Global Pacification* (London: Pluto Press, 2015), 143

¹¹ Yaniv Kubovich, “Israeli Arms Exports Spike 30%, Hit All-time High,” Haaretz, April 12, 2022, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2022-04-12/ty-article/.premium/israels-arms-exports-hit-record-high-in-2021/00000180-5b94-d718-afd9-dfbc36710000>.

nations spend similar amounts on weapons exports (and the U.S. spends over 10 times more)¹². The material goods leaving Israel do not in themselves explain the title of laboratory.

The argument of Israeli centrality to global violence relies on two main points besides exports: the spatial enclosure of Palestinians, and the concept of “permanent war”¹³. Any standard science lab relies on the principle of enclosure. You cannot properly test a method or hypothesis on a population that is free to leave at any time. Enforcing this type of restricted movement on people navigating their daily lives in their homelands is much more cruel, and in the case of occupied Palestine, involves “checkpoints, buffer zones, enforced identity cards, collective punishments, bulldozing, mass incarcerations without trial, imprisonment of suspects’ relatives, and associated landscape clearances and demolition of buildings deemed to be sheltering enemies”¹⁴. These technologies of confinement are what make the experiment possible, but they are also experiments themselves. No single one is unique to the OPT, they have been used all over the world, Canada, of course, being no exception. It is not their novelty, but their sustained use, consistent finetuning, and mimicry by other colonial states (for example the U.S. in Iraq¹⁵), that convinces proponents of the laboratory thesis that Israel is the nexus of this type of violent enclosure.

¹² Mike Stone, “U.S. weapons exports decreased 21% to \$138.2 billion in fiscal 2021,” Reuters, December 22, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-weapons-exports-decreased-21-1382-billion-fiscal-2021-2021-12-22/>.

¹³ Machold, “Reconsidering the laboratory thesis,” 89.

¹⁴ Stephen Graham, “Laboratories of war: Surveillance and US Israeli collaboration in war and security,” In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power*, edited by Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeeen Abu-Laban, 133-149 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 139.

¹⁵ The U.S. military, recognizing that conflict in Iraqi cities would look similar to what Israeli forces undertook in Palestine, drew heavily on their experience and methods. See Graham, “Laboratories of war,” 138.

Consistent and repeated experiments are the other factors that allow laboratories to function properly. War is always an opportunity for powerful states to test and perfect their methods of domination, but it is not always as long-lasting as the fight over sovereignty between Palestine and Israel. Jan Bachman describes how especially “fragile” states or “ungoverned spaces” become a “laboratory” where military and policing strategies “are tested under the umbrella of stability”¹⁶. This is not only true in Palestine. Sites of land-based conflict, post-colonial or otherwise, violent, or otherwise, have increasingly become playgrounds for global hegemony to flex their military prowess, without necessarily declaring war. In the context of the new wars of global intervention, “when military force is employed with mandates to ‘create conditions for peace’, ‘rebuild societies’, ‘foster reconciliation’ and so on, war, somehow, is no longer referred to as ‘war’”¹⁷. The ‘Israel/Palestine conflict,’ as it is so often named in popular media, is not a conflict but an occupation, a nicely-repackaged and re-branded invasion, a “permanent war”¹⁸. The fact of its permanence is what allows for more robust testing of strategy and technology. This is a central tenet of the laboratory thesis, and it is one that I do not dispute. However, it is important to note that this argument is not only used to criticize Israel’s military, it is also used as a selling point for their technology. Although they do not use the language of war, they rely on the idea that their tactics are “homegrown”¹⁹ to market their expertise internationally.

¹⁶ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, (New York: Routledge, Nov 13, 2014), 43.

¹⁷ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, 1.

¹⁸ Machold, “Reconsidering the laboratory thesis,” 89.

¹⁹ Neve Gordon, “Israel’s emergence as a homeland security capital,” In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power*, edited by Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeen Abu-Laban, 133-149 (New York: Routledge, 2011), 154.

In reality, there are many more players involved. If there is a war in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, then it is not two-sided. Israel receives more foreign military financing from the U.S. than all other recipient countries combined, at \$3.8 billion in the year 2020 alone.²⁰ Although the U.S. accounts for the majority of their weapons imports, Germany and Italy have also made significant contributions in this area.²¹ Canada's weapons exports to Israel, while not as considerable as the three countries just mentioned, increased by 33% in 2021.²² The Palestinian Authority, as the recipient of the second highest amount of international aid per capita in the world,²³ is no less connected to international capital. The States, unsurprisingly, also being a major donor to especially their military and security forces. In 2020 The U.S. gave \$19 million in total aid to Palestine, around 200 times less than to Israel in that same year.²⁴ This offering is not insignificant considering that it does not account for the training, infrastructure, and personnel included in their participation in the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). This project -which I will explain in depth in a later section- is mainly funded by the EU, Saudi Arabia, and the US, with major contributions from Canada, is mainly focused on security sector reform, and is mainly accountable to the Israeli government/military apparatus.²⁵

²⁰ Josh Ruebner, "Bringing Assistance to Israel in Line With Rights and U.S. Laws," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 12, 2021, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/12/bringing-assistance-to-israel-in-line-with-rights-and-u.s.-laws-pub-84503>.

²¹ Usaid Siddiqui, Mohammed Hussien, Owais Zahir and Mohammed Haddad, "Infographic: What you need to know about Israel's military," *Aljazeera*, June 4, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/4/infographic-what-you-need-to-know-about-israels-military>.

²² "Canada's Arms Exports to Israel Increased by 33% in 2021, Amid Gaza Bombing," *CJMP.org*, Canadians for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, May 31, 2022, https://www.cjpm.org/2022_05_31_canada_exports_arms.

²³ Nassar Ibrahim and Pierre Beaudet, "Effective aid in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?" *Conflict, Security & Development* 12, no. 5 (2012): 481-500, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2012.74418>, 482.

²⁴ Usaid Siddiqui, Mohammed Hussien, Owais Zahir and Mohammed Haddad, "Infographic: What you need to know about Israel's military".

²⁵ Monaghan, "Security development," 127.

The problem with imagining Israel as only an exporter of violence is that it fails to account for the international co-funding and co-creation of policing and military strategy.

Rhys Machold, a scholar of political geography rightly notes that “the fact that complex assemblages are at work in the production and mobility of security solutions branded as ‘Israeli’ is not an afterthought to be brushed aside”²⁶. These assemblages are not only contemporary, there is a long history of cooperation, mimicry and knowledge-sharing across colonial policing networks. In *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies*, Laleh Khalili traces the lessons learned through the British Empire’s invasion of northwest India, the United States’ expansionist wars against Indigenous nations, and the French conquest of Algeria, and how they evolved through study and practice. She explains how “particular carceral or juridical techniques in counterinsurgency practice were innovated or consolidated” during these wars that were then workshopped and updated by academics, politicians, and military elites (and in places where those spheres overlap)²⁷. Through field testing as well, tactics of military control have advanced to become much more expansive, preventative, and population-centered, rather than relying on simple “shock and awe” maneuvers²⁸. The Canadian state has become so adept at this ambiguous form of counterinsurgency that it often does not even factor into conversations around international systems of colonial policing, despite the RCMP being currently deployed in not only the West Bank, but in Mali, Haiti, Ukraine, and the DRC.²⁹

²⁶ Machold, “Reconsidering the laboratory thesis,” 94.

²⁷ Laleh Khalili, *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 13.

²⁸ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, (New York: Routledge, Nov 13, 2014), 206.

²⁹ “Current Operations,” Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Government of Canada, updated June 21, 2022, <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/current-operations>.

Canada and Palestinian Authority

When it is recognized that Israel is not innovating oppressive security solutions all on its own, often the only other contributor that is mentioned is the United States. As much as these two nations are stalwart conspirators in global violence, focusing so squarely on the most prominent actors allows for countries like Canada to go unnoticed. Canada's role in security sector reform in the OPT is surely not to be discounted. However, some historical context is necessary before examining the specifics of Canada's government, military, and police engagement in Palestine today. The Canadian state has been implicated in Zionism since 1947, when "as a member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine [...] Canada voted in support of the majority report calling for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states"³⁰. Since then, the official stance on Israel/Palestine has cautiously wavered under different Prime Ministers and different political and ideological climates.

Full rhetorical support for Israel eventually went out of fashion, as public sympathies swayed during the first Intifada³¹. However, actual policy changed very little as a result, as governments under the elder Trudeau, Mulroney, and Chrétien toed the line between "vague support for a Palestinian 'entity' or 'homeland'" without ever using the word state or putting too much stock in the idea of self-determination, lest they stoke the flames of Québec's own

³⁰ Rex Brynen, "Canada's Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," In *Canada and the Middle East: in theory and practice*, edited by Paul Heinbecker and Bessma Momani, (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press and The Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2007), 73-74.

³¹ *Ibid*, 75.

sovereigntist movement³². The Martin and Harper governments, although they officially advocated the two-state solution, took a more pro-Israel stance in reality, voting against a number of UN General Assembly resolutions meant to condemn Israel's treatment of Palestinians³³. Canada under Harper was even the first country to withdraw all aid from the PA after Hamas' electoral victory in 2006³⁴. Being the painfully liberal state that it is, Canada had no problem supporting democracy for Palestinians, until it posed any kind of threat to the status quo of Israeli occupation.

Of course, underlying this reluctance to recognize Palestinian autonomy and self-government is Canada's constant attack on Indigenous sovereignty at home. This country's history is riddled with broken treaties, imposed governments, and land theft. For Canada to condemn colonial intervention in any form of governance structure would be incredibly hypocritical. However, hypocrisy is also an integral feature of Canadian government policy. At the same time as they work to undermine a truly independent democracy in Palestine, the official government stance is now that "Canada recognizes the Palestinian right to self-determination and supports the creation of a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic and territorially contiguous Palestinian state"³⁵. 'Territorially contiguous' is especially rich considering Canada's forced relocation of so many Indigenous nations onto small, fragmented, and isolated reserves.

³² Rex Brynen, "Canada's Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," 75-77.

³³ Ibid, 78.

³⁴ Ibid, 78.

³⁵ "Canada-West-Bank-the Gaza Strip Relations," Government of Canada, accessed Dec 12, 2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/west_bank_gaza_strip-cisjordanie_bande_gaza/relations.aspx?lang=eng.

In the same breath, the statement goes on to name that “Canada has listed Hamas as a terrorist organization pursuant to the Canadian Criminal Code”³⁶. Criminalizing forms of dissent that go ‘too far’ allows for colonial states to set the limits of what is acceptable, legible political engagement. Anthropologist and legal scholar Darryl Li has written that “the concept of ‘terrorism’ is today useful only in delegitimizing the political actions of those stuck with the label”³⁷. That is made abundantly clear in this case. Within the western colonial frame, when Hamas uses violence they are terrorists, but when the IDF, RCMP, or the PCP (Palestinian Civil Police) use violence, they are simply keeping the peace, upholding the law, or providing stability. I do not mean with this argument to paint a romanticized picture of Hamas’ resistance to Zionism, or suggest that less confrontational groups are somehow less Palestinian. This is not my place. I do, however, wish to highlight a real frustration that many Palestinians express towards parties like Fatah that “just accept peace talks only”³⁸. Hamas, in their refusal to give up means of violent resistance, position themselves as “The only people still fighting Israel”³⁹. The Canadian government is obviously invested in supporting settler colonialism, so demonizing people who fight against it is no new phenomenon.

³⁶ “Canada-West-Bank-the Gaza Strip Relations,” Government of Canada, accessed Dec 12, 2022, [https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/west_bank_gaza_strip-cisjordanie_bande_gaza/relations.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/country-pays/west_bank_gaza_strip-cisjordanie_bande_gaza/rerelations.aspx?lang=eng).

³⁷ Darryl Li, *The Universal Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2020), 25.

³⁸ Nigel Parsons, “The Palestinian Authority security apparatus: Biopolitics, surveillance, and resistance in the occupied Palestinian territories,” In *Surveillance and Control in Israel/Palestine: Population, Territory and Power*, ed. Elia Zureik, David Lyon and Yasmeeen Abu-Laban (New York: Routledge 2011), 365.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

The same logic was at work at the Paris Conference that was called by the Middle East Quartet (The UN, US, EU and Russia) in 2007 after Hamas' attack on Fatah in Gaza.

Representatives from 100 countries gathered together "to consolidate international legitimacy for the Palestinian Authority and the demonization of Hamas as a terrorist entity within the 'war on terror'"⁴⁰. This conference was also where the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) was created -with very little input from Palestinians themselves-⁴¹. Canada pledged \$300 million to the PRDP, the bulk of which, \$150 million, went towards justice and security sector reforms⁴². And these reforms, unsurprisingly, were not designed for the benefit of Palestinians. In the same official stance on Palestine, I quoted earlier, the government states that

"Canada aims to uphold and promote the two-state solution by helping to establish a law-based, peaceful and prosperous society that can ultimately become a state for the Palestinians, and a stable and secure neighbour for Israel"⁴³. There is a lot of patronizing, colonial language packed in this one sentence, but the last phrase is the operative one here. At the end of the day, the PRDP was created "to satisfy Israeli requests for security"⁴⁴. While the \$8 billion in total allocated to the project was billed as 'aid', it has mainly been spent building prisons, modernizing border control, and training and equipping police and military forces to be better prepared to quell resistance⁴⁵. Canada, focusing exclusively on the West Bank has focused its funding more

⁴⁰ Monaghan, "Security development," 127.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid, 128.

⁴³ "Canada-West-Bank-the Gaza Strip Relations."

⁴⁴ Monaghan, "Security development," 128.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

narrowly on these security sector reforms, and especially on sharing lessons learned from its own colonial law enforcement and counterinsurgency experience.

The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan

Up until this point I have used the words military and police almost interchangeably, this was not an oversight but a deliberate choice in recognition of the context of western interventionism in which increasingly the practices of “‘war’ and ‘police/policing’ blur and bleed into one another”⁴⁶. As powerful states of the global north have continued to perfect the art of military engagement without a declaration of war, reliance on police as a tool for international population control has increased. The police forces of these wealthy nations have, in turn, become progressively more militarized or “‘professionalized,” as have those that they train⁴⁷. This trend can be clearly traced through Canada’s contributions to the PRDP. Both the RCMP and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have sent select personnel to the West Bank to assist the military and police forces of the Palestinian Authority, and both missions are described in government documents as being in pursuit of the “‘professionalization”⁴⁸ of either the PCP or the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF). For the PCP this has meant \$1.6 million for a new high-tech forensics program, contributions to the design of the Jericho Police Training Centre, and a multitude of RCMP-led trainings in public order policing⁴⁹. Among these trainings were “‘courses

⁴⁶ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, 3.

⁴⁷ Stuart Schrader, *Badges Without Borders: How Global Counterinsurgency Transformed American Policing*, (Oakland, University of California Press, 2019), 9.

⁴⁸ Monaghan, “Security development,” 130.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

on Local Informant Recruitment, Advanced Investigative Interviewing, the use of the Tonfa (police baton) and a course on the ‘Role of the Police during an Election’⁵⁰. Essentially, they are being trained in counterinsurgency and suppressing protests. In fact, the RCMP were responsible for training 1,000 PCP officers in responding to the election planned for 2009 that has been indefinitely delayed⁵¹. In the absence of an overt military occupation, police are indispensable in providing a more “shadowy”⁵² form of control, using repression to discourage protest, and sniffing out resistance before it can gain footing.

The PASF, which in reality is a collection of “policing-style agencies”⁵³ including the Palestinian Gendarmerie and the National Security Force, has been engaged in rather similar pursuits as the PCP, namely the suppression of Hamas. The PA security Apparatus as a whole has been described as “a torn Palestinian nationalist doppelgänger of Zionism’s *mukhabarat* [intelligence] state”⁵⁴(emphasis in original). It follows logically, then, that the main organized threat to Israeli hegemony has become the main focus of the PASF, as well their reformers. The United States Security Coordinator (USSC) is a U.S.-led body formed through the PRDP and responsible for reforming, or professionalizing, the PASF, and encouraging cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian security forces⁵⁵. The USSC, formerly led by US General Keith Dayton, has jumped on the task of targeting Hamas and performed it with abandon. So much so that

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, 1.

⁵³ Monaghan, “Security development,” 131.

⁵⁴ Nigel Parsons, “The Palestinian Authority security apparatus,” 356.

⁵⁵ “Operation PROTEUS,” Government of Canada, November 16, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-proteus.html>.

Hamas' press organs have described the PA's security forces as "the 'Dayton Forces'"⁵⁶. While Canadian military elites have not been nearly so visible in this project, they have certainly been involved. The main Canadian contribution to the USSC has been through Operation PROTEUS, a Canadian military task force based in Jerusalem that provides training and logistical support to the PASF⁵⁷. CAF leaders from PROTEUS have filled key roles within the USSC and become "an integrated part of the team," along with staff from the Netherlands, Turkey, and the UK.⁵⁸ Working in lock step, these international government and military actors have equipped the PASF with tools and technologies of domination and counterinsurgency.

In their examination of the RCMP's role in international policing, Bell and Schreiner describe how "counterinsurgency promises to exercise not only traditional war-fighting techniques, but also strategies of governance and development over the masses, as one solution to insurgency"⁵⁹. The PRDP has certainly provided quite a lot of funding and training for traditional military-style pursuits in the OPT. Canada alone allocated \$2.9 million to building an arms training center for the PASF and the PCP, among many other such contributions.⁶⁰ However, part of the professionalization of policing is also the extension of policing more and more into the everyday lives of the policed, and "through its shaping of social subjects

⁵⁶ Monaghan, "Security development," 131.

⁵⁷ "Operation PROTEUS," Government of Canada, November 16, 2022, <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-proteus.html>.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Colleen Bell and Kendra Schreiner, "The International Relations of Police Power in Settler Colonialism: The 'civilizing' mission of Canada's Mounties," *International Journal*, 73 no. 1 (2018): 126-127, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018768480>.

⁶⁰ Monaghan, "Security development," 131.

[...]making insurgency impossible, not ideologically, but practically”⁶¹. Large-scale surveillance, identity cards, and border regulation are all ways that policing has extended further into the lives of Palestinians. The Canadian government certainly uses its fair share of these techniques against Indigenous people back across the Atlantic, and has even been involved in strengthening and modernizing the borders enclosing Palestinians. The Canadian Border Services Agency, a notoriously racist and anti-Indigenous institution⁶², was specifically sought out by the USSC to consult on their “border-reform” project⁶³. Border reform may not seem as insidious or war-like as gun training, but it is just as much a tool of violent control.

Classic war tactics have not been forsaken in the context of military and police ‘stabilization’ missions, but they have been modified and diversified, with the aim of making war appear “more mundane, more regularized, and, ultimately, less ‘objectionable’”⁶⁴. The goal of counterinsurgency is to make violence so normalized that you no longer need to rely on it. As such, the gun, the tank, and the drone will never be abandoned, lest the threat of policing become empty. Relying more on the threat rather than the actual act of violence allows for colonial states and interventionist forces to make overtures to democracy and progressiveness, no matter how hollow this language might be.

Through extensive access to information requests from various Canadian government bodies, Jeffery Monaghan was able to piece together a comprehensive picture of the motivations

⁶¹ Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 265.

⁶² Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements: Dissent and the Security State* (Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2018), 12.

⁶³ Monaghan, “Security development,” 133.

⁶⁴ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, 1.

behind the Canadian areas of specialized funding for the PRDP. In one document he accessed from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), they rationalize the heavy military lean in their spending by saying that “a stable, peaceful and democratic society is made up of an effective, legitimate and accountable security system”⁶⁵. The language of accountability betrays the trend toward reformist, liberal rhetoric in the justification of international and state violence. Modern counterinsurgency is an expression of the “shift away from the enemy-centric approach to warfare, in favour of a population-centric approach,” an approach that “prioritizes persuasion and co-optation,” although it still relies on force⁶⁶. Although persuasion and co-optation are referring here to the populations living under interventionary forces (the Palestinians in the case of the OPT), the citizens of the donor country (in this example, Canada), also must be convinced of the humanity of their government’s actions. This is where the language comes in.

Laleh Khalili describes how “population-centric warfare is now considered a progressive form of warfare by many liberal interventionists in the European and North American capitals”⁶⁷. To spin the type of militarized domination Canada is helping to achieve in the OPT into something progressive is quite a feat, and requires adept manipulation of language and attention. In addition to assistance with border control, and policing techniques and technologies, Canada has invested significantly in bolstering and reforming the Palestinian criminal justice system. Another post-Paris Conference undertaking, project Sharaka (an Arabic word for friendship or partnership), was created as “a technical legal capacity-building project with the Office of the

⁶⁵ Monaghan, “Security development,” 128.

⁶⁶ Colleen Bell, “The police power in counterinsurgencies: Discretion, Patrolling, and evidence,” in *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, ed. Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, (New York: Routledge, Nov 13, 2014), 17-18.

⁶⁷ Khalili, *Time in the Shadows*, 47.

Attorney General and the public prosecution service of the Palestinian Authority”⁶⁸. Officially, the aims of this project were strengthening the PA’s “judicial independence and developing human rights capacities”⁶⁹. Really what they were doing was training prosecutors so that they might go on to criminalize the same revolutionaries that the police and military were identifying⁷⁰. Using the language of human rights to justify intervention and distract from the violence that comes with it, is a classic liberal rhetorical strategy, and one that Canadian government and policing bodies have down to an art.

Canada and the Algonquins of Barriere Lake

Darryl Li has described the Gaza Strip as an experiment in perfecting the “optimal balance between *maximum control* over the territory and *minimum responsibility* for its non-Jewish population”⁷¹ (emphasis in original). Canada has been engaged in this same balancing act since its inception. In both cases, the primary tool that allows for colonial equilibrium is the police. The majority of Canada’s ‘aid’ to Palestine after 2007, and in fact most of the international aid they have received, has been directed towards police and military spending. Housing, infrastructure, and all types of actual human needs have been comparatively neglected in the process of the “securitization of aid”⁷². The securitization of aid has gone hand-in-hand with the professionalization of policing, which, in Canada, has meant that spending on security

⁶⁸ “We Are Justice: Alnoor Meghani,” Department of Justice, Government of Canada, June 16, 2022, <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/weare-cestnous/p8.html>.

⁶⁹ Monaghan, “Security development,” 129.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Darryl Li, “The Gaza Strip as Laboratory: Notes in the Wake of Disengagement,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 35, no. 2 (2020): 38-39, <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2006.35.2.38>.

⁷² Monaghan, “Security development,” 139.

increased by \$92 billion from 2000 to 2011 as part of the war on terror.⁷³ In 2019 Canada spent \$15.7 billion on police budgets alone,⁷⁴ -not counting the military and other security agencies, which, as I will demonstrate, are fundamentally intertwined with policing- and this number continues to rise despite insistent calls for defunding. Large swaths of this budget have gone towards the repression of Indigenous resistance in recent years. In fact, the RCMP have spent upwards of \$25 million targeting land defenders in Wet’suwet’en territory alone⁷⁵. The counterbalance to this inflated police spending is the crumbs that are left over for actual services. The Canadian government has taken “minimum responsibility”⁷⁶ to the extreme, not only chronically underfunding education, healthcare, and infrastructure on reserves, but fighting tooth in nail in court against those who challenge their austerity⁷⁷. In another wildly hypocritical move, the state often uses the effects of their own austerity policies to justify police/military intervention in sovereign territories. Andrew Crosby and Jeffery Monaghan, in their work on the surveillance of land and water defenders in so-called Canada, point out that “claiming to assist with crime, poverty, or development remain dominant techniques used by contemporary colonial agencies to justify targeting Indigenous movements”⁷⁸.

⁷³Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements*, 14.

⁷⁴ Patricia Conor, Sophie Carrière, Suzanne Amey, Sharon Marcellus and Julie Sauvé, “Police resources in Canada, 2019,” Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Statistics Canada, December 8, 2020, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/85-002-x/2020001/article/00015-eng.htm>.

⁷⁵ Amanda Follet Hosgood, “RCMP Spending on Pipeline Conflict Reaches \$25 million,” The Tyee, October 18, 2022, <https://thetyee.ca/News/2022/10/18/RCMP-Spending-Pipeline-Conflict/>.

⁷⁶ Darryl Li, “The Gaza Strip as Laboratory: Notes in the Wake of Disengagement,” *Journal of Palestinian Studies* 35, no. 2 (2020): 38-39, <https://doi.org/10.1525/jps.2006.35.2.38>.

⁷⁷ Olivia Stefanovich, “Trudeau government seeks judicial review of tribunal decision to compensate First Nations kids,” CBC, October 29, 2021, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/human-rights-tribunal-liberal-child-welfare-appeal-1.5308897>.

⁷⁸ Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements*, 6-7.

It is not a coincidence that the language of ‘development’ is used so frequently across global colonial contexts. It is a tool of white supremacy that allows for interventionary forces to “disassemble and reassemble societies deemed ‘problematic,’” all under the guise of supporting democracy⁷⁹. This logic is very clearly identifiable in the case of the integrated police and government effort to suppress persistent resistance to colonial encroachment on their governance system by the Algonquins of Barriere Lake (ABL). ABL -or Mitchikanibikok Inik- territory, the 44,000 square kilometers surrounding the Ottawa and Gatineau rivers (including the land that the Parliament sits on today), was never ceded⁸⁰. And yet, in the 1960s, the nation was pushed onto a fifty-nine ve of sandy, eroding land, and even that, in the 1980s, was assailed with chemical-spraying and clear-cutting by logging companies⁸¹. Protesting this industry encroachment, and the government's continued failure to honour the treaties they’d signed, the Algonquins blocked the highway.

Their resistance resulted in a new treaty signed with Canada and Québec that would protect their territory and allow them to continue to refuse entering into the federal land claims process⁸². This treaty was not respected either, and the government continuously attempted to undermine their governance system to allow logging companies greater access to their territories. The conflict came to a head in 2006 when Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) outrightly refused to recognize the traditional leadership and the Mitchikanibikok Inik resumed

⁷⁹ Jan Bachman, Colleen Bell and Caroline Holmqvist, *War, Police and Assemblages of Intervention*, 1.

⁸⁰ Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements*, 28.

⁸¹ *Ibid*, 30.

⁸² Shiri Pasternak, *Grounded Authority: The Algonquins of Barriere Lake against the State*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2017), muse.jhu.edu/book/52001, 185.

their direct land defense⁸³. This time, the government crackdown was harsher and more organized. In a 2007 report commissioned by INAC, former diplomat Marc Perron writes that “INAC has a duty to intervene because of the incompetent and confrontational attitudes of the community’s leadership”⁸⁴. Here we can see the limits of resistance being policed, although not by an official policing body. Blocking a highway is simply too “confrontational,” so much so that the government needs to intervene, to protect the population from ‘extremists’ and for the ‘good’ of the community itself. Intervention, in this case, meant that INAC invoked section 74 of the Indian Act to force band council elections, subvert the legitimacy of the ABL legal code, and depose their leadership⁸⁵.

INAC anticipated resistance to this move, so they were prepared when it arrived. Barriere Lake had been labeled as a “hot spot” for extremism and a “potential domestic security threat” in 2006 through an integrated surveillance database used by the RCMP, INAC, CSIS, and the government of Canada⁸⁶. This allowed for these agencies to access more of the resources set aside for fighting terrorism, and for them to collect more data on the people leading the blockades. It also allowed for coordinated efforts across policing and government bodies. When the section 74 elections were called, the Sûreté du Québec (SQ) was called in to make sure they went ahead with “no interference”⁸⁷, a ridiculous choice of words considering the elections themselves were a result of colonial interference. If the ‘democracy’ that the Canadian

⁸³ Ibid, 174.

⁸⁴ Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements*, 28.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 50.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 40.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 54.

government is so eager to share has to be imposed over the barrel of a gun, then who does it really serve? Barriere Lake is, of course, not the only example of Canada using policing to extinguish sovereignty, until 2008 it was actually one of very few remaining nations not to be coerced into the Indian Act governance system. Canada's "perpetual low-intensity warfare"⁸⁸ against Indigenous peoples is ongoing, and it is certainly paralleled by their involvement in Palestine.

Conclusion

Admittedly, Canada has a different relationship with the Palestinian Authority than with the Algonquins of Barriere Lake. Palestinian lands are not being directly stolen by the Canadian government, and the RCMP are not the main occupying force in the OPT. Although Canadian military, government, and police assemblages are not the driving force behind dispossession and repression in Palestine, they are absolutely involved in propping up efforts led by Israel, the US and the EU to keep Palestinians surrounded, surveilled, and dependent on their restrictive aid. The tactics used in both settings are unsurprisingly quite similar. Through a more subtle, inoffensive form of warfare, policing has expanded into Indigenous lives and communities more and more. The explosion of police and security budgets that came with the war on terror allowed for the colonial regulation of Indigenous populations that was already long underway to become more professionalized and perhaps more effective -both because of new technologies and new rhetorical justifications-. Interference in governance structures, the imposition of 'democracy'

⁸⁸ Craig Proulx, "Colonizing Surveillance: Canada Constructs an Indigenous Terror Threat," *Anthropologica* 56, No. 1 (2014): 83.

and the language of ‘development,’ isolation from traditional territories, the demonization of ‘terrorists’ and ‘extremists’, large scale surveillance practices, and “population-centric”⁸⁹ counterinsurgency are all intertwined with policing and the “security state”⁹⁰. This is not only true in Palestine and Barriere Lake, these tactics have also been tested and refined in colonial spaces worldwide.

In noticing these similar tactics it becomes clear that Israel and the US are not the only nations to be engaged in the honing and exportation of violent means of control. The first international RCMP mission to Namibia in 1989 to “oversee transitional elections and to train its nascent police force”⁹¹ was not the beginning of Canadian international policing. The Northwest Mounted Police, which later became the RCMP, were tasked with undermining the sovereignty of distinct and self-determining nations from the outset of their creation, a few years after confederation. John A. Macdonald directed that this force “should be styled Police, and have ... military bearing”⁹², demonstrating the inextricable link between these two supposedly separate institutions, and the perpetual efforts of the Canadian government to downplay their use of violence. ‘Styling’ Canada as less aggressive, less militarized, and less oppressive has been a lengthy project, and one whose lessons have certainly been shared the world over. At the risk of oversimplification, Israel just has not existed as long. They have not had the same time to perfect

⁸⁹ Khalili, *Time in the Shadows*, 47.

⁹⁰ Andrew A Crosby and Jeffrey Monaghan, *Policing Indigenous Movements*, 3.

⁹¹ Colleen Bell and Kendra Schreiner, “The International Relations of Police Power,” 112.

⁹² Quoted in Colleen Bell and Kendra Schreiner, “The International Relations of Police Power,” 118.

their PR, to “reformat policing to make state violence simultaneously less blatant but more diffuse and omnipresent”⁹³. At this, Canada is well-practiced.

With this argument I do not wish to make Canada into the laboratory, to try and trace all state violence back to roots in one dominion. Rather, I wish to shine a light on a largely unnoticed player in the game of transnational policing and point to the co-creation of the strategies that inform it. Domination is a global project; it is always being tested and perfected. The colonial status quo relies on policing getting more efficient, more comprehensive, and more elusive as we get deeper and deeper into crisis. If we wish to confront state violence in Palestine or Canada, we must be able to see the links between them. Looking to one root of colonial policing tactics distracts from the whole network hidden under the mud, where the real power lies.

⁹³ Schrader, *Badges Without Borders*, 146.

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